Introduction

Colonialism, Occupation, and the Burden of Tutelage

One of the most remarkable chapters in the history of education has been written since the opening of the twentieth century in the Philippine Islands. . . With the coming of Americans a system of education embodying the ideals of universality, practicality and democracy, was brought into the Islands. . . Under the very guns of the American troops schools were established; wherever the American flag went, a school was found.

—A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands

General MacArthur, firm in his conviction that a sound educational program was basic to the development of a new and democratic Japan, directed the Japanese Government to establish immediately a normally operating school system and to encourage the inculcation of concepts—and establishment of practices in harmony with representative government, international peace, the dignity of the individual.

—Lieutenant-Colonel D. R. Nugent, Chief, Civil Information and Education Section

In the Hollywood film Teahouse of the August Moon (1956), set in postwar Okinawa (arguably Japan’s first colony), the earnest but doltish Colonel Wainwright Purdy, a parody of the colonial official convinced of his civilizational superiority, sends Captain Fisby on a mission to the village of Tobiki to build a schoolhouse. Early in the film, the Okinawan Sakini, Fisby’s interpreter and the mouthpiece of satire, speaks directly to the audience, informing them in his broken English, “Okinawans most eager to be educated by conquerors.” Fisby arrives in Tobiki ready to build the schoolhouse, immediately establishes a Ladies League for Democratic Action, and sets in motion elections for mayor. The film satirizes the U.S. occupation of Okinawa and the occupation goals of education, democracy, and capitalism. The people of Tobiki want a teahouse instead of a schoolhouse, democracy gets carried
too far when women want to exercise their rights and complain to Washington, and the handicrafts the villagers produce at the behest of Fisby find no market. Illustrating the imperial objectives of occupation, orders from Washington are to construct a pentagon-shaped schoolhouse. As Fisby explains to the villagers nonplussed by the word “pentagon,” “It’s like a building in Washington, folks, and everybody is going to learn about democracy.” When Fisby proclaims the benefits of U.S. rule, a thin elderly villager presents him with a gift and artlessly connects the occupation with the U.S. colonization of the Philippines. To Fisby’s surprise, the villager speaks in English and explains, “In my youth I work in Manila. How is McKinley?”

Of course, what the film satirizes is bad occupation and colonial paternalism, but it also suggests that Americans should, in fact, be good occupiers who, with the aid of some Yankee ingenuity, can help the natives realize their own dreams. Indeed, by contrasting good and bad paternalism, the film reinforces the value of good American occupation. It also invites viewers not to take the natives seriously by having Marlon Brando play the role of Sakini. Fisby blends in so easily with Okinawans that he is not really colonial. He goes native, wearing his bathrobe all day instead of a kimono; enjoys the company of his geisha, Lotus Blossom; savors the local custom of drinking tea while watching the sunset in silence; and lets the villagers get their teahouse. The mock ending of the film, when Purdy fires Fisby (only to finally rescind because Tobiki is going to be showcased as an exemplary occupation site), provides the occasion to articulate a sentimental imperialism. Gently refusing entreaties of marriage from a tearful Lotus Blossom, Fisby prepares to leave and declares complete identification with Okinawans: “I think I felt an awful lot like you people felt, always being conquered. You know, now, I’m not sure who’s been conquered and who’s the conqueror. I’ve learned in Tobiki the wisdom of gracious acceptance.” So with a sleight of hand, the film declares that the occupation of Okinawa is not really an occupation and effaces the power dynamic between occupiers and natives.

But while the film glosses over the Battle of Okinawa—the most brutal in the Pacific War, in which a quarter of the local population was decimated, where abysmal poverty prevailed during an occupation far harsher and more martial than that of the mainland, and where the U.S. Army paid no compensation for its appropriations of land—the first few minutes of Teahouse of the August Moon comically set out the themes that are central to this book: the importance of schooling and the creation of suitable pedagogical subjects to the project of U.S. imperialism; the paternalist, colonial conception of teaching natives; the ability of natives to challenge, question, and reroute the tutelary enterprise; the ultimate defeat of the educational project; and, interestingly, the continuity of U.S. colonial-educational projects in the Phil-
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Thus, when Fisby attempts to represent the government’s Americanization mission benevolently, he is upended by the villager, who reminds Fisby of the U.S. colonization of the Philippines by William McKinley. The film is diegetically noncommittal about English being mandatory in the Philippines, but the language’s very use by the villager reminds viewers extradiegetically about the imposition of English on the archipelago through schooling. The film, set in 1946, the year of the Philippines’ independence from the United States, and made in 1956 while Okinawa was still occupied, momentarily alerts viewers to the continuity of U.S. colonialism (the United States occupied Okinawa until 1972) and its tutelary projects. Yet it is the villagers who also reverse colonial tutelage and “teach” Fisby, who assents to the building of a teahouse instead of a schoolhouse.

Campaigns of Knowledge argues that beginning in 1898, the creation of a suitable pedagogical subject through schooling emerged as a central technology of U.S. power overseas, one that was therefore deployed in the materially different circumstances of the colonization of the Philippines and the occupation of Japan. Although separated by half a century, in vastly different sociopolitical landscapes, and with disparate agendas, the creation of a new school system in the Philippines and educational reforms in Japan, both with stated goals of democratization, speak to a singular vision of America as savior following a pattern of a politics of violence followed by a pedagogy of recovery in which schooling was central. More than a means for disciplining individual bodies in space (although it was undoubtedly that, as well), schooling was conceived as a process of subjectification, of creating particular modes of thought, behavior, aspirations, and desires that would render them docile subjects, amenable to American-style colonialism in the Philippines and occupation in Japan. Although Campaigns of Knowledge focuses on the Philippines and Japan, subjectification through schooling as a strategy for controlling racialized Others was worked out first in the United States through reservation schools started by Richard Pratt and in Hampton and Tuskegee. Overseas, this biopolitical technology has been exercised in diverse ways to buttress and consolidate U.S. imperialism wherever it was deemed feasible: in Hawai’i Puerto Rico, Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, South Korea, and, arguably, now in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, military personnel are well versed in theories of hegemony and continue to look at schooling in the Philippines as an exemplary instance of counterinsurgency that should be followed today (see Ruscetta).

Behind the construction of this racialized pedagogical subject and the articulation of the project of benevolent tutelage, however, were doubts and hesitancies of administrators, and Filipinos and Japanese were not willing and supine subjects. As John Willinsky points out, despite colonial schools
instilling ideas about the European nation-state, “the young often sought to repay this instruction with articulate, defiant, and sometimes violent expressions of a home-grown nationalism” (92–93). *Campaigns of Knowledge* uses a contrapuntal method, examining educational documents of the colonial and occupation archive and putting them in conversation with native cultural texts that register these subjectifications. These educational documents reveal at once the scripting of tractable pedagogical subjects amenable to U.S. rule or military power through enculturation, based on a presumed racial difference; the constant renewals, assertions, and defenses of this subjectification as educators attempt to justify the tutelary project and reconcile their lived experiences of students (who question or refuse this subjection and do not mimic the colonial/neocolonial order in expected fashion) with the colonial mission; and the contradictory desire of educators to create Americanized subjects and yet to maintain the separation of “almost but not quite” (Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 91). Well-known Filipinos and Filipino Americans and Japanese and Japanese Americans, including Nobuko Albery, Carlos Bulosan, Gilda Cordero-Fernando, Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston, Kojima Nobuo, R. Zamora Linmark, Julie Otsuka, Bienvenido Santos, Masahiro Shinoda, and Edith Tiempo, have offered a wide array of fictional, cinematic, and autobiographical responses to the tutelary project and its legacies. Thus, representations of the classroom and the encounter with the American text, learning, teaching, being taught, and the desire for colonial knowledge reveal a complex interplay of assent and coercion, collaboration and defiance, and hegemony and resistance, as well as ambivalence between resentment and guilt.

Yet none of these cultural texts simply accepts the discourses of racialization and imperialism that undergird the U.S. colonial/occupation rhetoric of tutelage. The colonized, as Frederick Cooper (16) and many others have argued, have always deflected and reinterpreted colonial strictures. Thus, while Filipino and Filipino American, Japanese, and Japanese American literary and cultural works may testify to the continued resonance of—and, indeed, attraction to—forms of colonial knowledge, they also complicate and challenge the project of subjectification in different ways: using civilizational logic to dismantle the paternalism of tutelage, strategically acceding to a colonized pedagogical subjecthood to advance their interests, drawing on the resources of the folk and community to proffer different epistemologies, offering forms of decolonial thinking, invoking intersectional memories to challenge the discourse of singularity in the educational project, seeing colonial tutelage ambivalently or as melancholia, and rewriting history affectively.

By reading educational documents as both policy statements and ideas in the making, using a contrapuntal methodology of viewing the colonial
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archive alongside native cultural texts and comparing colonial Philippines and occupation Japan, Campaigns of Knowledge puts forward a series of interrelated arguments. First, as mentioned earlier, the subjectification of natives as suitable pedagogical subjects was essential to the Philippines’ colonization and Japan’s occupation. Second, this subjectification relied on a racial (often gendered) difference that constantly had to be reiterated and modified, revealing the hegemonic yet malleable nature of colonial racial ideologies. Circumstances, cultures, educators, and legislators on the ground affected both the goals and the technologies of governance in the Philippines and Japan. Third, while both Filipinos and Japanese were objects of colonial tutelage, they were racialized in strikingly different ways. Filipinos, often seen through the lens of domestic racial categories, had to be culturally uplifted, while the Japanese, seen as foreign, had an excess of culture. Fourth, pedagogical inscription is contested by formulating different forms of collective subjectivities and through forms such as collaborative dissent, which often contest hegemony by laying claim to aspects of it. Finally, the tension between the ideal subjects scripted by colonial pedagogy in official documents and the resistance to and uneven materialization of this pedagogy, as seen in cultural texts that register its operations, suggests a failure of inscription; the mission of schooling, that is, was destined to remain incomplete. 3

My study of the pedagogical subject of U.S. educational policies in the archives of colonialism and occupation in the Philippines and Japan, as well as in Filipino and Filipino American, Japanese, and Japanese American texts, is a history of ideas that tracks the inception, as well as the subjective afterlife, of a specific form of imperial governance. It is situated at the nexus of U.S. empire studies and Asian American studies, as well as within the specific fields of occupation studies (senryo kenkyu); the burgeoning field of postcolonial Filipino studies; and the nascent field of postcolonial education studies, which, despite the publication of Gauri Viswanathan’s Masks of Conquest in 1989 has not seen much growth.4 Campaigns of Knowledge performs the important task of integrating these fields and putting them in conversation with one another in the interdisciplinary manner of postcolonial studies while contributing to them through a cultural studies lens.

By attempting to change language and education by requiring the use of English and disallowing the use of Spanish and vernaculars in public schools in the Philippines, and by promulgating the use of romaji in public schools in Japan, in addition to inculcating the “American” values, American forces were pursuing a complete colonization of the linguistic symbols of nation and culture, the signifiers of ideas, communal and familial identity, self and the Other. 5 It was, as Bernard Cohn aptly argued in relation to British colonialism in India, not just the occupation of physical space but the occupation of “epis-
However, unlike the British in India, who even after the Mutiny of 1857 did not attempt to enforce a singular language (although English was undoubtedly the language that allowed entry into the administrative structure) and left cultural institutions relatively intact even as they embraced the civilizing mission, the Americans followed to an extent the putatively more egalitarian French model of assimilation, which assumed, at least in theory, that all could become French. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, American colonialism and occupation were at once egalitarian in the French sense in that they assumed that natives could learn to be citizens of a liberal, capitalist democracy; hierarchical in that these natives were Othered through racialization and gendering; and hegemonic in attempting to create subjects who would desire a mythologized America—a wealthy, egalitarian, unified nation unfractured by race or class, based on the virtues of a masculinist, possessive individualism, industry, and freedom. Thus, from the very beginning of the colonization of the Philippines, American officials proclaimed their intention to oversee the country’s independence premised on the idea that Filipinos, like Americans, could learn democracy. But they continued to insist on delayed independence because Filipinos needed guidance, and they often racialized Filipinos as lazy, lacking (muscular) vigor, and dishonest. Similarly, the Japanese were seen as inherently conformist, compulsive, ritualistic, feudal, and subservient (see Minear, 41–42)—qualities that allowed them to be recruited for ultranationalism—but also capable of overcoming these cultural characteristics and building a society of individualism and capitalist democracy.

What also distinguished the program of American schooling in the Philippines from those of colonial powers such as Britain, France, and Spain was the speed, thoroughness, and intensity with which schools were established in the colony. After all, less than a month after Admiral George Dewey’s destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in May 1898, American soldiers opened the first school on the island of Corregidor. By 1900, a Department of Public Instruction had been established under the direction of the U.S. Army, and by the end of the year, Fred Atkinson, a high school principal from Massachusetts, was established as the general superintendent of public instruction. Atkinson immediately centralized all public schools under the Board of Education and stipulated English as the medium of instruction as soon as possible. A year later, the USA Transport Thomas brought five hundred American teachers to the Philippines, followed by six hundred more in a few months; these teachers came to be known as the Thomasites. All of this happened while the United States engaged in a bloody war with Filipinos who had proclaimed independence in 1898 with a constitution modeled on that of the United States. The Philippine-American War, which has been
relegated to national amnesia and introduced infamous techniques such as the water torture, claimed anywhere from 250,000 to a million Filipino lives and continued for several years after the U.S. invasion. Trying to subdue an intransigent rebellion, General Arthur MacArthur, then the military governor, asked for school funding specifically as an “adjunct to military operations, calculated to pacify the people and procure and expedite the restoration of tranquility” (Forbes, 423).

Seeing education as a hegemonic counterinsurgency mechanism and themselves as liberators of the populace from the Spanish, Americans immediately secularized Spanish Jesuit education. Unlike the Spanish, who conducted schools in both Spanish and the vernacular, Americans quickly mandated English-only instruction, striving to create an Americanized populace through a standardized curriculum. While the Spanish prioritized higher education until 1863, when they established a nationalized primary school system, Americans stressed primary education, thus creating the conditions for both increased mass literacy and English proficiency. Accordingly, by 1939 a quarter of the population could speak English (Rafael, “Anticipating Nationhood”). As detailed in Chapter 1, within a decade texts conducive to colonialism, such as Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s *Evangeline* and *The Song of Hiawatha*, alongside hagiographies of American presidents, were introduced in elementary schools. Many of the elite, however, continued their education in parochial schools and remained fluent in Spanish in addition to learning English (Rafael, “Anticipating Nationhood,” 72).

The establishment of an Americanized school system in Japan shortly after the beginning of the occupation in August 1945 followed a similar speed and urgency. Schooling, as D. R. Nugent stated, was integral to the mission of radically changing Japanese society and aligning it with new geopolitics. Although the presence in Japan was putatively an Allied occupation, General MacArthur, who held the sovereign title Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), ensured that the occupation bore the stamp of U.S. power and catered to U.S. interests. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, iconic photographs of MacArthur stepping off the airplane, pipe in mouth, to accept the surrender and the famous photograph of him towering over Hirohito dramatized the more powerful masculinity of the United States over the diminutive masculinity of Japan. Little wonder that even historians who are highly critical of Japanese imperialism, such as Renato Constantino, refer to MacArthur as the new *shogun* (*The Second Invasion*, 9).

With MacArthur we witness a remarkable continuity between colonialism in the Philippines and Japanese occupation. Douglas MacArthur, whose father had been the military governor-general of the occupied Philippines in
1900, had himself served in the Philippines in the 1920s; he was appointed field marshal of the Philippines in 1935 and liberated the country from the Japanese. MacArthur thus had intimate knowledge of the Philippines before he came to Japan as SCAP and waxed eloquently about the educational work in the Philippines as “one of the most romantic chapters in Philippine history” (Reminiscences, 24). Writing about his governance of Japan, the “world’s greatest laboratory for an experiment in the liberation of a people from totalitarian military rule,” MacArthur worried about the problems of prolonged occupation; he recalls trying to learn from “the lessons my own father had taught me, lessons learned out of his experiences as military governor of the Philippines” (Reminiscences, 282). Arguably, his experience in the Philippines was instrumental in SCAP’s focus on educational reform. The Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan, completed in March 1946, became the veritable guide for educational reform during occupation. As discussed in Chapter 5, the reforms recommended the adoption of romaji, based on the Romanized alphabet, rather than on kanji (logographic Chinese characters used in Japanese along with kana); a grade system that followed the American school system; the removal of Shinto shrines from schools; a veritable interdiction of traditional Japanese sports, which were perceived as martial; and, as in the Philippines, progressivist instructional methods geared toward child-centered learning.

This book argues that despite the urgency of both missions as a means of biopolitical reproduction of colonized and occupied subjects, U.S. educational policies in the colonial Philippines and occupied Japan were contrasting projects of Orientalist racial management. Two cartoons—one from the early colonial period in the Philippines, and the other from the period of Japanese occupation—succinctly illustrate the contrast. In February 1899, several months after soldiers began running rudimentary schools in the Philippines as a means of quelling the insurgency, the Journal of Detroit documented this schooling in a political cartoon that demonstrated the colonial racial difference at the heart of this benevolent project. Titled “The White Man’s Burden” (echoing the sentiment of virtuous colonization manifest in Rudyard Kipling’s contemporaneous poem), the cartoon depicts a tall, muscular, white American soldier, armed with a rifle, forcibly carrying an unwilling Filipino (see Figure I.1). The soldier tirelessly climbs uphill in long strides across a battlefield strewn with corpses, to which he pays no heed, to a schoolhouse displaying an American flag, thus marking schooling as a colonial project. He tramples on a bloody past and looks ahead to a benign future. The soldier and the Filipino are contrasted in relation to the school: the Filipino has his back toward it, unmindful of the benefits of colonial education, while the soldier determinedly faces up to his task to tutor the native. The Filipino is an unruly
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savage, represented through stock signifiers of Indianness, wearing only feathers and crude adornments but also caricatured as African American through his thick lips; he stares at the viewer, eyes wide open, hair standing up, as if in shock. He does not know where he is going to be taken at the end of conflict, but it is clear that this savage will be “uplifted” and civilized. Such representations, as Servando Halili points out, were potent in demonstrating Filipino savagery and backwardness (59–80).

The second cartoon, published in 1945 in the *Pittsburg Post-Gazette*, also dramatizes forcible schooling (see Figure I.2). Four children sit in a Tokyo classroom with their backs to the viewer. The classroom has been taken over by the Americans, as the U.S. flag displayed on the teacher’s desk makes clear. An American officer, presumably MacArthur (his cap has three stars), strides into the classroom, displaying muscle, vigor, and a determined agenda. The movement of his body is akin to that of the American soldier in the first cartoon; however, instead of carrying the white man’s burden, he is here to disabuse Japanese children (who are civilized enough to be in the classroom) of any ill-founded ideas about Japanese power or pride. The teacher is caught in a running posture, barely entering the classroom in time to teach the children, suggesting the Americans’ need for vigilance. The children appear shocked at the first lesson being emphatically presented to them: Japan lost the war. The classroom is a metonym for the nation: clearly what these
A racialization of Filipinos and Japanese was carried out during the occupation of the two sites. Filipinos were seen as racially Others, as were the Japanese. While Filipinos were tribalized and denationalized, the Japanese were viewed as victims of an arcane hyper-Orientalized culture. Bound by Shintoism, emperor worship, obsessive rituals, and fanaticism, the Japanese were deemed fit for industrial education.儿童需要的是再教育。日本人也被种族化，但作为丑陋的亚洲人: 他们的脸转向黑板，揭示出在羞辱性代表中常见的巨大龅牙。因此，尽管菲律宾人和日本人都是被看作种族的 Others，但其种族化方式不同，因此在两个地点所要实施的种族项目也不同。一旦菲律宾人被有效地部落化并去国家化，他们就会被视为野蛮人或小棕色兄弟，被提升并归化为适合工业教育，就像印度人和非洲美国人一样。而一些人区分了受过教育的马来人和“原始” Negritos，许多人认为所有阶级都有野蛮的元素，并认为 Emilio Aguinaldo（反抗美国统治的菲律宾共和国总统，直到1901年被捕）是野蛮的（Miller, 54-55, 65）。在 broad terms，菲律宾人缺乏文化，日本人则有过多的文化。
also technologically modernized, culture and had to be appropriately deculturated and reeducated (Dower, War without Mercy, 18–20, 124–125).10 “Re-education,” as discussed in Chapter 5, was an official term repeatedly used by the military and education officials in policy documents. Unlike in the Philippines, in Japan industrial education and vocational training were never objects of concern for the educators who oversaw reform. In sum, while Filipinos were racialized like racial Others within the nation, Japanese were racialized as threats without. And while the Reverse Course of occupation lifted the more punitive measures, since Japan began to be seen as an ally, specific ideas about deculturation and reeducation remained. Little wonder, then, that in the mid-1980s Japanese economic power was often represented through tropes of militarist invasion (Makin, 8–16). However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 5, both Filipinos and Japanese were seen as imitative rather than creative, irrational rather than rational, and, ultimately, behind the West in the teleology of civilization. Both Filipino and Japanese subjects were asked to distinctly imagine the nation. Theirs were to be modern nations, rejecting effete pasts and built instead on principles of liberal capitalist democracy that upheld freedom and social equality, but on an individual rather than a structural level, and premised on the unstated fairness of market relations. Educators in the Philippines emphasized the urgency of inculcating in students the importance of materialism while those in Japan affirmed learning practices suited to a Taylorist efficiency.

Just as important, Filipinos and Japanese were encouraged to value a possessive individualism over commitments to tribe or community. The pedagogical subject Americans strove to engender was the modern subject of Anglo-American culture, a “unitary-expressive and rights-bearing bourgeois subject,” as Dipesh Chakrabarty puts it (143). Such a subject was, as Frantz Fanon recognized, conducive to colonialism, which had “hammered into the native’s mind the idea of a society of individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity” (The Wretched of the Earth, 47). A collective subjectivity, or nonindividualist practices that were often the basis for resistance to colonialism and occupation, such as the Filipino concept of bayanihan and cooperative endeavors invoked by the revolutionary leader Apolinario Mabini in the 1896 revolution, were not encouraged (Delmendo, 14). In Japan, kinship norms of respect for elders were deemed inimical to learning and creativity. In addition to resistance, what educators effectively attempted to control was what Anibal Quijano saw as essential to colonialism: a repression of indigenous “modes of knowing” and producing knowledge (169). Colonial logic dictated that for Filipinos what was advocated was individual self-reliance (Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Self-Reliance” were exemplary teaching tools here) but not political
enfranchisement; the Japanese were offered individual freedom from militarism but not the freedom of protest for leftist teachers and students deemed subversive or freedom from U.S. hegemony. Japanese and Filipinos were both enjoined to be model citizens of their own nations paradoxically by being grateful to the United States as a guarantor of their nations’ freedom and celebrating U.S. culture and its icons as symbols of equality.

John Willinsky sees a pattern in schooling for the colonized in which “it was made to stand against family and community, against a culture that seemed to fly in the face of the ostensible rationality and enlightenment of the colonial power. Schooling, in this sense, was meant to wean the child away from the learning and life associated with what was regarded as an expired era, an eclipsed form of life” (95). Willinsky’s argument about controlling forms of culture that challenge colonialism’s purported rationality and enlightenment get complicated, however, in the case of Japan, itself an erstwhile colonial power. In the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, many intellectuals in the United States had dubbed Japan the “Britain of the East.” George Kennan, for instance, had seen the Japanese as having access to discourses of modernity (Lye, 23, 33). Japanese schooling under occupation, unlike that of the Filipinos, was thus devised for a defeated nation, yet one that had been a major military threat and rival imperial power and therefore had been admired in some ways by educators. Japan’s was not so much a culture of the past (despite characterizations of its rituals as feudal), as famously theorized by Johannes Fabian, as a nonviable form of the present. For example, bushido (codes of conduct for Japanese men and soldiers, variously emphasizing loyalty, self-sacrifice, and pure Confucian values), which had been admired by many in the West, was seen during and after the war as a dangerous hangover from an earlier period. In sum, Japan’s imperial culture had to be changed rather than uplifted; Filipinos had to be civilized, while the Japanese had to be de-civilized. Filipinos had to be educated while the Japanese had to be reeducated. Yet both were Asians and correspondingly racialized and gendered as inferior in relation to whites. Germany, which was also subject to postwar reeducation, for instance, was not seen as tuitionary and, as is made evident in Chapter 5, wrought feelings of timidity in U.S. educators handed the task of changing German education, while Italians were seen as inherently good, malleable people on whom fascism had been imposed (Buchanan, 219–220; Dower, War without Mercy, 33). By contrast, Japanese and Filipinos were racialized by educators through the discourses of Orientalism and tropicalism, respectively, and sometimes through distinctly different forms of Orientalism.

In describing the project of schooling and the subjectification therein as a form of power, I am drawing on Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality, which—following the lead of postcolonial studies scholars—I would argue
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began in the colonies alongside or after brutal suppression. Based on life-inducing mechanisms, governmentality addressed the problems of “how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed” (“Governmentality,” 87). Foucault further goes on to explain governmentality as an “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex forms of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (“Governmentality,” 102–103). A particular form of biopower exercised at the level of population, governmentality transforms earlier forms of power based on the sovereign’s will and represented by laws, as well as forms of disciplinary power, to work instead through mechanisms that provide populations with the structures they require to live, to feel secure about their lives, and to reproduce their social conditions. Foucault clarifies that governmentality does not simply replace a society of sovereignty or a disciplinary society based on punishment. Rather, the three form a triangle of “sovereignty-discipline-government” (“Governmentality,” 102). Although Foucault conceives of this triad and its functioning only in Western liberal democracies, and his formulation has justly been taken to task for being Eurocentric (see Stoler), I find the formulation useful with the modifications of the colonial and imperial contexts.

Here I take seriously Partha Chatterjee’s powerful critique of Foucault’s idea of governmentality, the universality of the “modern regime of power” that works by making social regulations part of self-disciplining and makes power more productive and humane. Chatterjee posits instead the centrality of the “rule of colonial difference” and argues that colonial power was “a modern regime of power destined never to fulfill its normalizing mission because the premise of its power was the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group” (15, 18). He demonstrates that just as modes of biopower were being put into place by the colonial state in India, the more prominent racial difference became (19). Gyan Prakash similarly argues that “colonial governmentality could not be the tropicalization of its Western form but rather its fundamental dislocation.” The colonial state, estranged from “ideals of law and liberty” could not develop civil society and mobilize “capillary forms of power,” which depend on the positioning of the state’s knowledge and regulations “as disciplines of self-knowledge and self-regulation” (Prakash, 31).

Chatterjee and Prakash rightly point to the ubiquity of the rule of colonial difference, which challenges the normalizing function of governmentality. Both in the colonial Philippines and occupation Japan colonial (racial) difference was presumed and operative in different modes of power. Yet because colonialism in the Philippines after the Philippine-American War al-
ways included the rhetoric of self-government, and because the occupation of Japan was presented as a step toward a democratic future, forms of governmentality could function to a limited extent and in certain contexts. Filipinos were promised independence if they were capable of self-government, the route to which was being the ideal pedagogical subject envisioned by educators. The United States operated through a colonial governmentality, inducing colonial conduct but carried out through what David Scott has called the “desiring subject.” Scott uses the example of the jury system in Sri Lanka, which established a technology of regulation that “reach[ed] down to the very ‘motives’ of the native and not only constrain[ed] or induce[d] him to alter them but also to encourage[d] him to appreciate the alteration” (111, 113). Analogously, the pedagogical subject of U.S. empire was clearly a construct of colonial difference/racism, a subject who would believe the mythos of American freedom (despite Jim Crow and colonialism) and see it as coterminous with individualism, a desiring subject of governmentality. Manuel Quezon’s oft-quoted comment, “Damn the Americans, why don’t they tyrannize us more?” comes to mind (Thomson, Stanley, and Perry, 120). The limited rights and forms of local self-government offered Filipinos at different moments were not a change from colonial rule to democracy but, rather, a change in tactics of colonial rule that masked its workings even more. In Japan, forms of democracy inspired by progressivism and a rights-centered ideology were enacted through authoritarian rule in a manner that John Dower refers to as “schizophrenic.” Dower also argues that although the populace’s weariness after decades of war may have made it more amenable to embracing occupation, there was no singular Japanese response to occupation (Embracing Defeat, 24–27).

The workings of the sovereignty-discipline-governmentality triad were starkly evident in the colonial Philippines and occupation Japan, where overt punitive machineries of colonial violence and disciplining of individuals coexisted with salubrious technologies of governmentality of which pedagogical biopolitics were central. As discussed later, arrangements of the classroom, forms of physical activity, the apportionment of the school year, and the management of space were all central to the project of subjectification in the Philippines and Japan. In the Philippines, a remarkable conjunction of sovereign thanatopolitics and salutary governmentality through schooling emerged as key to U.S. colonial rule and occupation. The centralization of all public schools in the Philippines in 1901 and the standardization of courses of study for primary schools under David Barrows in 1903, the secularizing of schools in Japan, and the mandatory textbooks on democracy introduced under occupation all speak to a structure through which governmentality was enabled. The fact that by 1914 Dean Worcester could confidently claim that “baseball is
Comparative Imaginations and Specters

I invoke the titles of two magisterial studies—George M. Frederickson’s *The Comparative Imagination* and Benedict Anderson’s *The Specter of Comparisons*—to explain my focus on the Philippines and Japan and the dialectical pairing of official documents with fictional, cinematic, and autobiographical representations. For Frederickson, historical comparison, more than a method or procedure, is an “antidote to parochialism,” which actually “makes the experience of individual nations more meaningful” (7). Paradoxically, a key to comparison is establishing a common international context, which for Frederickson was the global struggle against imperialism and racism (9). For Anderson, comparisons are specters that haunt our perceptions. Anderson uses the experience of José Rizal’s protagonist, Ibarra, in *Noli Me Tangere* when he returns from a colonial education and sees Manila’s botanical gardens through their sister gardens in Europe as if through an “inverted telescope.” He cannot simply experience them but sees them simultaneously near and afar through comparison (*The Specter of Comparisons*, 2). Comparisons estrange the familiar and enrich our understandings of the discrete.

This comparative study uses two very distinct sites, with disparate histories and relationships to the United States, to demonstrate the structural similarities and political goals of colonial and occupation schooling and, yet, the particular contingencies and difference of both sites. Colonial rule in the Philippines was justified on the grounds of freeing Filipinos from tyrannical Spanish rule and preparing them for self-government; the Allied occupation of Japan was consequent on a military victory over an imperial power that had brought misery to its population (a fact emphasized by occupation forces to the virtual neglect of the suffering inflicted on other Asian populations) and was justified as a period of demilitarization and democratization by decree. U.S. colonialism in the Philippines continued for close to half a century, while the military occupation of mainland Japan lasted six years. Unlike the period of the occupation of Japan, the Philippines became a colony during the high tide of U.S. colonialism, which included taking over Puerto Rico, Hawai‘i, Guam, and Samoa. Filipinos and Japanese have also experienced different restrictions on immigration to the United States. Allowed entry into the United States as nationals consequent on the colonization of the Philippines, Filipinos found their entry severely curtailed through the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, which pronounced them aliens and limited
their immigration to fifty per year. The Japanese, by contrast, experienced both legal racial exception and racism. The Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, signed into law by Theodore Roosevelt, who had placed the Japanese in the same rank as the Englishmen and Irish (M. Hunt, 79), allowed entry to parents, children, and spouses of Japanese immigrants (while barring the entry of laborers) and had the effect of increasing migration. The “Japanese exclusion clause” in the Immigration Act of 1924, however, effectively singled out the Japanese as “aliens ineligible for citizenship” because the 1917 and 1921 acts had already excluded all other Asians (Koshiro, 229).

Given these contrasts, one might reasonably ask why I have chosen to compare the Philippines and Japan rather than, perhaps, the Philippines and Puerto Rico or the Philippines and Hawai’i. I have no argument against the comparison of these concurrent colonizations; indeed, the few comparative studies of these colonizations have been extremely rich. However, the juxtaposition of the Philippines and Japan is useful for several reasons. First, the comparison of the production of colonized subjects through schooling in a formal colony and then during occupation reveals the continuity of this tactic of U.S. imperialism in areas of military occupation, arguably a major strategy of neocolonial and neoliberal control until the present. Second, the radically different sociopolitical landscapes of the Philippines and Japan are testaments to the ubiquity of U.S. tutelage as an arm of empire. Third, the temporal contiguity of colonialism in the Philippines, which ended with the beginning of occupation in Japan and includes some of the same historical actors, allows a fascinating glimpse into how technologies of pedagogical biopolitics changed from formal colonialism to a military occupation that itself changed during the Reverse Course. Although imperial violence and recovery through education was a pattern of U.S. colonialism and occupation in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, South Korea, and, arguably, Afghanistan and Iraq, the Philippines and Japan offer the most radically different sociopolitical landscapes. In no other country than the Philippines was U.S. sovereignty and governmentality pitted against a nation that had just fought a colonial power and declared its independence. The Philippine proclamation of independence in June 1898, its ratification by the Malolos Congress later that year, and the Malolos Constitution of 1899, which proclaimed popular sovereignty, were all ignored by the United States, which proclaimed the Philippines as its territory ceded from Spain. The first American schools were accordingly opened against the backdrop of revolutionary nationalism and intense Filipino-American hostilities.

In contrast, Japanese schooling was devised for a defeated nation, yet one that had been a major military threat and rival imperial power and had been admired in some ways by educators. In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese
War, the Japanese were seen as both a threat and a nation belonging to modernity. The popular novelist Jack London, for instance, accepted the appellation of the Japanese as the British of the Orient but was clear that the Japanese were still Asiatic and thus inferior to whites. The Japanese were seen as better than other Asians, but their conduct in World War II had convinced Americans that Japanese imperialism had fostered a dangerous militarism that necessitated cultural overhaul. By the same token, concerned Americans attributed the anti-American feelings of Filipinos (after a short period of gratitude following the defeat of the Japanese) to Japanese rule, which had created antipathy toward the white race and diminished respect for the white man (Koshiro, 18).

However, despite these major differences, educators and colonial officials often compared the two peoples, their cultures, and the strategic value of the two sites for the United States. For instance, in the Senate hearings on affairs in the Philippines held shortly after the Philippine-American War, senators and colonial administrators spent appreciable time considering Filipinos and Japanese. Senator Albert Beveridge testified to “an inherent difference in physical and nerve vigor between the Japanese and Filipino” while deliberating industrial capacity in the Philippines (Affairs, 711). David Prescott Barrows, superintendent of education in the Philippines, drew contrasts between industrial growth in Japan and the Philippines, arguing that while population density drove the Japanese to hard work and industrial growth, nothing of a similar nature could occur in the Philippines for centuries (Affairs, 710). Others wondered about the introduction of English in the Philippines. Senator Fred DuBois quizzed Barrows about the effects of English education, using as a comparison the introduction of English in Japan in high schools. Both DuBois and Barrows concurred that the addition of English had not been a threat to the Japanese national character (Affairs, 700). Two years later, in his annual report, Barrows demonstrated clearly the significance of Japan in considering education in the Philippines. He wrote, “We look to the Japanese for illustration of very much that is helpful in solving Philippine problems. There the most notable educational achievement of modern times has been effected.”

Japan as a rising power and as a nation that, after the Meiji Restoration, was selectively following Western modernity fascinated leaders and colonial educators, particularly because American teachers had been hired to advise the Japanese Ministry of Education in the 1870s. Indeed, William S. Clark, selected the first president of Sapporo Agricultural College in Hokkaido in 1876, was also asked whether a group of Americans wanted to establish a colony in Hokkaido (Maki, 165). Some lessons, it seemed, could certainly be learned. Conversely, educators and administrators of occupied Japan often
reflected on their experiences in the Philippines. Commenting on the *Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan*, the major educational document of occupation, William Bagley, an established educator, wrote that if the report was followed, the occupation would hold “a place in history that [would] rival, if not surpass, the record of American idealism now written so large in the annals of the Philippines and of China” (389). MacArthur, the virtual sovereign of occupation Japan, conceived of the Japanese in a tutelary manner, similar to ideas educators had about the Philippines. Despite their “antiquity measured by time,” he argued, the Japanese “were in a very tuitionary condition.”

While both Filipinos and Japanese as a race may have been conceptualized as tuitionary, some of the methods envisioned for teaching them were not different from the methods being implemented in schools in the United States. Educators in the United States propounded child-centered, progressivist models of learning, particularly after the publication of John Dewey’s *Democracy and Education* in 1916, and the same methods were proposed in the Philippines and occupation Japan. But while this similarity suggests that educators may have viewed American (white) children and Filipinos and Japanese as equally adept, they did so in a contradictory manner. As Thomas D. Fallace maintains, many progressivists, including Dewey, rejected theories of biological determinism but believed in the theory of recapitulation, which argued that individual development “retraced the development of the human race” and that people of color represented earlier stages of human development (2–3). Nonwhites could improve but were ontologically inferior to whites. Consequently, progressive educators rationalized differentiated curricula based on the perceived predispositions of racial groups, even if they argued for similar methodologies of teaching. Such rationales, Fallace argues, governed the education of American Indians, African Americans, and the students of color in colonized territories such as Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Hawai‘i (13). Japanese deculturation could also be written into recapitulation.

By comparing the U.S. colonial Philippines and occupation Japan, this book also reveals the ubiquity and persistence of racial difference in the creation of Asian pedagogical subjects. At the same time, however, it continuously explores and foregrounds the fact that colonial racism, even when directed toward Asian subjects, proceeds from discourses that are multiple, fragmented, nuanced, and ever shifting both spatially and temporally. Discourses of race, empire, and tutelage are not fixed but malleable concepts of analysis, but that does not make them any less hegemonic in a particular time and space: witness the different racial justifications offered for language reform in the Philippines (discussed in Chapter 1) and in Japan (discussed in Chapter
Colonialism, Occupation, and the Burden of Tutelage

5), as well as the racialized discourses at play in the creation of Brides Schools in postwar Japan (discussed in Chapter 5). While the documents of governmentality reveal the technologies of attempting to create docile raced bodies amenable to U.S. colonialism and, later, strategic militarized outposts in the Pacific Rim, Filipino and Japanese writers and filmmakers invite us to see these technologies from an inverted telescope, as it were. Nabuko Albery, Carlos Bulosan, Gilda Cordero-Fernando, Kojima Nobuo, R. Zamora Linmark, Camilo Osias, Bienvenido Santos, Masahiro Shinoda, and Edith Tiempo variously critique, resist, and strategically accommodate to, but almost always question, the ubiquity of U.S. pedagogical biopolitics. Their works not only reveal the paradoxes of desire and resentment, appropriation and critique, but also delineate the particularities of racial formations and practices and point to the plural and contingent process of colonial racial subjectification as it intersects with discourses of class, gender, and community.

Japanese Occupation of the Philippines

My focus on the Philippines and Japan should not be taken to mean an equation of the geopolitics of the two nations or a forgetting of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, which itself is a different area of study. As established in Chapter 5, some of the technologies for creating suitable Japanese subjects under occupation and those for creating tractable Filipinos under U.S. colonialism eerily resembled those used by the Japanese in the Philippines. During their occupation of the Philippines from 1942 to 1945, the Japanese took seriously the task of spreading the use of Nihongo, as the Japanese language was called. Military Order 2 of 1942 called for the “diffusion” of Nihongo, which was taught at all levels of education and became a graduation requirement at the University of the Philippines. However, in keeping with wanting Filipinos to take pride in their culture, and in contrast to U.S. policy in the Philippines, Tagalog and Nihongo were declared as the two official languages under Military Ordinance 13. Spanish was banned and English continued piecemeal, despite intentions to prohibit its use, because it was the only common language between the Japanese and Filipinos (Steinberg, 51). Filipino educators strove to circumvent the rules about Nihongo as much as possible, with Camilo Osias (whose readers are discussed in Chapter 2) managing to change the curriculum so that the requirement for teaching a national language, renamed “Filipino language,” was instituted from the first grade and Nihongo was not introduced until the fifth grade (D. Martin, 142–143).

Hoping to capitalize on anticolonial sentiment, the Japanese attempted to erase what they saw as the degenerate materialism, individualism, and epicu-
reanism of Anglo-American cultural influences and promote instead an Asian moralism and culture—indeed, a pre-Spanish indigenous culture—as long as it aligned with Japanese interests. In a much publicized speech, the Japanese military commander-in-chief declared that Americanism had created a spiritual degeneration among Filipinos that would lead them to “the very brink of racial extinction.” At a meeting of a training camp for schoolteachers in Manila in August 1942, the Director General of the Japanese military stated in a speech that “the guiding spirit of education shall be such as will eradicate undesirable Anglo-Americanism, such as the government of the masses, self-centered lack of restraint and the craving for things material and easy living.”

Japanese educators likewise promulgated a pedagogy of discarding Western influence. As Professor Masanori Oshima put it, “With respect to Western civilization, [the policy] is one of discriminate rejection; with respect to Eastern civilization, it is one of discriminate acquisition” (quoted in Gosiengfiao, 230). Thus, the Textbook Examining Committee compiled new textbooks and, in a foreshadowing of SCAP’s methods, issued orders to eliminate “improper and unsuitable parts,” such as references to the Gettysburg Address, “The Star-Spangled Banner,” and Thanksgiving Day (Gosiengfiao, 231, 234).

To curry favor with nationalists, Japanese educators created a commission of Japanese and Filipino scholars to study aspects of Philippine culture and make recommendations for education. However, Japanese officials expressed frustration with not being able to find an authentic pre-Spanish culture and having to improvise with existing folklore and legends (Gosiengfiao, 240). Like the Americans, the Japanese promoted the celebration of Rizal as a hero both in schools and in the society at large but also insistently publicized Japanese aspects of Rizal’s life, including his death, which was seen as samurai-like, and the fact that his great-great-grandfather was Japanese (D. Martin, 157–158). At the same time the dissemination of Japanese culture in schools was effected by the introduction of stock signifiers of nation: singing “Kimigayo,” the Japanese national anthem; celebrating holidays such as Emperor Hirohito’s birthday; and using Japanese radio taisō for physical exercises in schools rather than free play. A major and substantial difference between American colonial tutelage and that of the Japanese, however, was that there was no discussion of, or desire to continue, the child-centered, Deweyan models of learning that had preoccupied American educators in the Philippines since the 1910s. The focus was on what students learned rather than on how they learned.

Japanese exhortations to Filipinos to exorcise the demon of American (and Spanish) colonialism and their attempts to foster indigenous pride were, in fact, not different from sentiments expressed by Filipino educators in the commonwealth period. For instance, in a speech at Centro Escolar University
in 1939, Benito Soliven lamented that Filipinos, “fascinated by the allure of foreign ideologies . . . [had] embraced them with eagerness and enthusiasm, neglecting that which is legitimately and typically his own.” He beseeched, “Let there be a reflowering of the Filipino soul in its pristine beauty” (19, 24). However, Japanese occupation came at a time when English had been adopted in all public schools, U.S. and Filipino troops were fighting together, and the commonwealth status of the country had outwardly ensured Filipino leadership in public and political spheres. As a result, the occupation was seen as a foreign invasion even as Japanese cultural propagandists played an anticolonial tune and granted the Philippines its putative independence under Jose P. Laurel, arguably a puppet president. No less significant was the public resentment against prescribed forms of behavior, including bowing before Japanese sentries and forms of shaming, such as slapping in public, sometimes even for failing to bow correctly (Dower, *War without Mercy*, 7; Rafael, “Anticipating Nationhood,” 78). Such norms of behavior contrasted sharply with those of Americans in the Philippines, even though structural inequalities persisted. Thus, although the Japanese propagated a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, they also made clear that the center of this sphere was a superior Japanese culture and race, and in this sense they bought into Western paradigms of racial hierarchy. As Yukiko Koshiro has suggested, the United States and Japan often cultivated a common racial ideology, acclaiming the other’s suitability for world leadership (3).