Kiara is sitting in her car, parked in the parking lot of a major sporting-goods chain, changing from her polished and professional receptionist’s outfit of a frilly blouse, black pants, suit jacket, and black heels to a more athletic-looking top and sneakers. Kiara, twenty, is an African American college student majoring in sociology at a large state university, where she runs track and field. She is hoping to go to graduate school and eventually become a social worker. She started working in her early teens and has always had a job in the service sector, working for large chains and franchises, often struggling to find part-time jobs in service or retail. For the past year, she has been juggling two jobs: as a receptionist at a physical therapy center for children and as a sales associate in the apparel section of a major sporting-goods retailer. When you ask her how much she works, she says she works part time, but in the past year, she has been averaging twelve to fifteen hours per week as a receptionist and twenty-five to thirty hours per week at the sporting-goods store, putting her above forty hours most weeks.

Because she does not get enough hours at either job to pay her bills, she keeps both, even though she is not happy with the working conditions at either of them. She has shoe boxes thrown at her because she cannot accept expired coupons, and she listens to parents shouting at her because of insurance companies’ high deductibles. Her schedule has been so hectic in the

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1 All names of participants and businesses are pseudonyms, and identifying characteristics have been changed.
past month that on Saturdays, she leaves her shift at the physical therapy center at 4:30 p.m. instead of 5:00 p.m. (if the last parent pays early) just to make it to her second job at the sporting-goods store. Every Saturday in the past month, she has changed out of her office-appropriate professional attire into her sporty outfit in her car. To maintain the appearances required by the two employers, she constantly invests in two wardrobes. Despite the increasing demands and her rising investments in the jobs, her hourly pay has remained unchanged, and her employers have failed to give her enough hours at either job.

Emily, similarly, has been working as a babysitter since she was twelve years old. Today, she is a twenty-one-year-old double majoring in social sciences and education, with plans to become a teacher. She first started babysitting for her neighbors’ newborn baby nine years ago, when the parents were out to get dinner on Friday nights. She continued babysitting, and now she takes care of up to four siblings after school, driving them to and from school, scheduling playdates and after-school events, coordinating extracurricular activities and hobbies, and doing light cleaning, laundry, and cooking and running errands. The previous week, with numerous school cancellations and adverse weather conditions, was so hectic that she missed her own classes. Despite her heavy workload and ever-increasing job demands, she has not had a pay raise for a long time. Her job description kept changing, including more tasks, more children, and more unpaid preparation time, yet her paycheck is essentially the same as when she began babysitting. Still, she does not feel that she can ask for more money.

When scholars talk about the gender wage gap, they focus on years of peak earning potential, the effect of marriage and motherhood (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; Ridgeway and Correll 2004), unequal divisions of household chores (Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie 2006; Bittman et al. 2003), balancing work and family responsibilities (Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011), gendered expectations of workplace habits (Britton 2000), structural and cultural barriers against advancement (Alessio and Andrzejewski 2000; Garcia-Lopez 2008; McGuire 2002), and the willingness and ability of women to negotiate higher salaries or better work conditions (Babcock and Laschever 2003; Bowles, Babcock, and Lai 2007). But stories like those of Kiara and Emily tell us that gendered inequality in the workplace starts much earlier than such concerns suggest, and a true understanding of the gender pay gap requires an understanding of the gendered inequalities faced by the youngest workers in our society. The pay gap does not start when women are thirty or forty. It has roots in the work of children as young as twelve, and if our society wants to eliminate the pay gap, it needs to understand how it begins.
Kiara and Emily are two examples of many young women who work part-time while still going to school. Working part-time as a student is a quintessentially American phenomenon (Greenberger and Steinberg 1986) with roots in early American farms. Throughout American history, adolescents have always worked, and today, almost every student works sometime before the end of high school (Besen-Cassino 2014; Herman 2000; Marsh and Kleitman 2005; Manning 1990; Mortimer 2005; Zimmer-Gembeck et al. 2006). According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, since the 1950s, the part-time employment of sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds has been a constant component of our economy, with substantially higher rates of participation in the labor force in the summer than during the school year. During the 1980s, teen participation in the labor force increased substantially, reaching peak participation rates. After the recession of the late 2000s, labor-force participation rates for sixteen- to nineteen-year-olds declined, with teenagers finding themselves in competition with older workers who are recently unemployed or immigrants (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011; see also Sternheimer 2016).

Because of the economic recession of the late 2000s (Pew Research Center 2015) and increasing economic inequality in the labor market (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014), the increase in the number of teenagers in general, and the more demanding hiring standards of retail and service sector jobs (Besen-Cassino 2014; see also Casselman 2016), a smaller percentage of teenagers holds jobs compared with the previous decade.

Despite a decrease in employment rates after the recent economic recession, teenagers continue to be solidly integrated into our workforce. In When Teenagers Work, Ellen Greenberger and Laurence Steinberg observe that “the large teenage, part-time labor force that staffs the counters of fast-food establishments, waits on customers in retail stores, assembles parts in industrial settings, and cleans motel rooms and office buildings has become such a familiar part of our social landscape that we may fail to note its unique character or to ponder its social significance” (1986, 3). In both the service sector and freelance jobs like babysitting, many young women are strongly entrenched in our workforce. Therefore, work experience, along with all potential problems of labor markets, such as the gender pay gap, begin much earlier than the onset of the completion of formal education and the onset of full-time employment.

The gender wage gap is one of the most persistent problems of labor markets and women’s lives. Today, an average full-time working woman makes eighty-two cents for every dollar a man makes, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013; see also Kimmel 2015; Hegewisch and Edwards 2012; Hegewisch and Williams 2013; Wade and Ferree 2015). The gender wage gap has improved substantially over the years: in 1820, women earned thirty-five
cents for a man’s dollar, which increased to fifty-six cents in 1930, sixty cents in 1970, and seventy-two cents in 1990 (Wade and Ferree 2015). However, the closing of the gap is not due to massive increases in women’s pay but rather to the substantial decline in men’s wages due to loss of high-wage, skilled manufacturing jobs (Fligstein and Shin 2003; Fortin 2008; Goldin and Katz 2007; Hegewisch and Edwards 2012; Kimmel 2015). Despite the rapid gains of the 1970s and 1980s, the rate of progress in closing the gap has been stagnant (Blau and Kahn 2004; Fontin 2008; O’Neill 2003). The gender wage gap is such an important social problem that in 1996, President Bill Clinton declared a day in April to be National Pay Inequity Awareness Day; the date signifies that an average woman has to work until early April of the next year to reach a man’s earnings from a given calendar year.

This inequality has long-term effects. Over a lifetime, the average woman will make $434,000 less in income than the average man. A college-educated woman will lose approximately $713,000 over the course of her career (Arons 2008). The wage gap also affects women’s economic stability during retirement years, as it influences social security benefits (Calasanti 2001; Kimmel 2016; Wade and Ferree 2015). Despite improvement over time and slight variations based on sector and country—the gap is smaller among lower-paying jobs, higher among professional degrees, and higher among older workers—the gender wage gap remains a resistant problem in our current economy (Wade and Ferree 2015) and remains partially unexplained (Blau and Kahn 2006; Padavic and Reskin 2002; Valian 1999).

Why do women get paid less than men do? Researchers in and outside academia have offered a myriad of explanations. Typical explanations from the media include assertions that women have babies, women take time off from work for child care, women do more housework, women do not negotiate as much as men do, and women do not care about the money.

Typical academic explanations for the wage gap have three distinct orientations, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. The first set of explanations, the human capital approach (Becker 1964), focuses on individual characteristics and highlights personal differences between men and women workers, such as differences in education, work experience, and credentials (England 1997; Gottfried 2013). This view argues that women are not paid as much as men do because they do not have the same credentials and work experience (Berk and Berk 1979; Blau and Kahn 2006; Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011; Cohen and Huffman 2007; Hersch and Stratton 1997; Hochschild 1989; Mincer and Ofek 1982; Padavic and Reskin 2002; Ross 1987; Waldfogel 1998), rendering them less productive (Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011, 201; Gottfried 2013). Scholars advocating this approach explain that these personal differences in human capital are mostly due to the maternal
and domestic duties of women; they argue that having children, taking time off from work, child-care responsibilities, and unequal housework demands render women less productive, taking away time and investment in their human capital and resulting in unequal pay (Gottfried 2013). Even though prior research attributes much of the wage gap to individual differences in education, skills, and job experience, these factors do not explain all of the earnings gap (Altonji and Blank 1999; Blau and Kahn 2006; Fuller and Schoenberger 1991; Goldin 1990; Groshen 1991; Paglin and Rufolo 1990; Schilt and Wiswall 2008).

A second set of explanations, the occupational segregation approach, focuses on occupational characteristics and argues that men and women are paid differently because they work in different sectors, at different positions and occupations. This approach suggests that men are concentrated in more managerial positions, full-time positions, and positions with more authority and higher options for advancement (Blum, Fields, and Goodman 1994; Budig and England 2001; Cohen and Huffman 2007; England and Folbre 2005; Fuller 2008; Hearn and Parkin 2001; Huffman and Cohen 2004; Reskin and McBrier 2000; Reskin and Padavic 1994; R. Smith 2002) and that invisible barriers, or glass ceilings, prevent women from access to these higher-paying jobs (Cotter et al. 2001; Hultin 2003; Wright and Baxter 2000).

The third approach focuses on differences in values and beliefs about work and argues that men and women are paid differently because they value different aspects of work with differential emphasis on monetary gratifications. This approach suggests that men get paid more because they care more about money and material benefits, while women value more social, altruistic, and nonmonetary gratifications (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001; Gottfried 2013). In addition, this approach finds that men tend to be more leadership oriented and competitive (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003; Kuhn and Weinberger 2005), which might result in higher pay.

These theories are vastly different in focus and approach. However, they all have one thing in common. No matter how they approach the problem of the gender wage gap, they all focus on adult employment, despite the fact that Americans begin working well before their education is completed. Looking at earlier work experiences includes a previously neglected portion of the workforce and provides a more comprehensive understanding of the wage gap. Today, work experience for many American teenagers begins as early as twelve years of age and remains an important social and economic component of teenagers’ lives. Many teenagers do not work just a few scattered hours, either. According to the U.S. Department of Labor’s “Report on the Youth Labor Force” (Herman 2000), 8 percent of fourteen-year-olds
and 17 percent of fifteen-year-olds work over fifteen hours per week. Therefore, work is an important part of teenagers’ lives in the United States, economically, socially, and in terms of providing identity (Besen-Cassino 2014). Teenage labor also constitutes a substantial portion of our service economy, with teenagers constituting 4 percent of the American service work force. Therefore, in studies of important social problems such as the gender wage gap, focusing on just the adult labor force reflects only a small and nonrepresentative sample of our work force.

In addition, youth employment offers a natural social laboratory where many typical confounding factors are naturally controlled for, as many typical explanations of the pay gap are not applicable for young workers. Twelve- and thirteen-year-olds are not married, and they generally do not have children. It could be argued that adult men and women may tend to have different job experiences and skills, but at these ages, boys and girls have the same education levels, job experiences, and skills. Any difference in the rates of pay between them, therefore, cannot be due to these sorts of background factors.

Finally, by looking at early employment experiences, we can trace the origins of the gender wage gap and pinpoint exactly when gender inequalities emerge and offer explanations. By understanding early inequalities, we can see how these early differences contribute to future inequalities.

Pay Gap: Prior Work

While the youth pay gap has not received much academic attention, the adult pay gap has been widely explored. Because work is an important part of people’s lives and their identities, work has emerged as an important arena where gender inequality is played out (England and Folbre 2005; Gottfried 2013; Reskin and Padavic 1994). A wide range of scholars, including sociologists, economists, and psychologists, have studied this persistent problem of labor markets and tried to answer why women get paid less than men do. To understand how these explanations may, and may not, apply to the youth labor market, it is important to explore each of them in more depth.

The first set of explanations of the pay gap, the human capital approach, focuses on individual factors and argues that women are simply more likely to have certain characteristics that lead people to be paid less. This approach argues that characteristics like education, job training, and years of experience (Becker 1964) affect pay, and since women, on the whole, have fewer years of education, fewer advanced degrees, fewer certifications, and lower graduation rates, as well as fewer years of training and fewer years of job experience, women, in general, would be expected to be less valuable to the
employer (Becker 1964; Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011). This is reflected in pay: women’s pay is lower because their human capital is lower, resulting in lower productivity (Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011; Gottfried 2013).

Education is a determining factor in whether individuals work, which positions they have, which jobs they hold, and how much they earn. However, differences in education do not really explain sex-based differences in pay. While such differences in education have been offered as potential explanations historically, today such explanations would not be applicable (Blau and Kahn 2000, 2006; Bobbitt-Zeher 2007). Especially in recent years, women’s participation in higher education has proliferated rapidly, with women’s college attendance and graduation rates surpassing men’s (Haveman and Beresford 2012). Despite much higher college attendance and completion rates by women, human-capital-approach scholars argue that women are concentrated in different fields than men are. For example, they point to lower participation of women in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields (Prokos and Padavic 2005), business, and other higher paying positions (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010; Carrell, Page, and West 2010; Prokos and Padavic 2005; see also England and Li 2006; Reskin and Bielby 2005).

While there are no significant educational gender differences between men and women today, training is an area of significant gender differences. Partly due to cultural and social beliefs about gender roles, and partly due to employees’ and educators’ actions, women and men receive differential job training both in schools and at their jobs. For example, in high school, guidance counselors channel male and female students into different courses based on cultural biases of gender-appropriate jobs (Kane 1991). These occupational aspirations, choices, and suggestions are “shaped by individuals’ assessment of their likely success in a given activity, and the individuals adjust their activities in light of the gendered expectations that others have of them” (Castagnetti and Rosti 2013, 632; see also Correll 2001, 2004; Ridgeway 2009; Ridgeway and Corell 2004; Winslow 2010).

Such biases are not limited to individual guidance counselors, but are reflected in our legal system. For example, federal law establishing vocational education specifies job training for male students and home economics for female students (Reskin and Padavic 1994). Apprenticeships, similarly, run by unions under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Education, often exclude women (Reskin and Padavic 1994). Even on the job, women receive less training (Carey and Eck 1984, 12). For example, employers train 44 percent of construction workers, whereas only 5 percent of secretaries receive training on the job (Carey and Eck 1984, 5, 18). Employers are willing to provide training for traditionally male jobs, whereas for traditionally female
jobs (such as nursing or secretarial work), employers expect female workers to obtain the training on their own (Reskin and Padavic 1994). Today, the Department of Labor has created many apprenticeship opportunities, especially in newer fields like health care, and little information exists about gender inequalities in these new apprenticeship positions so far (Schilt and Wiswall 2008).

Similarly, male workers are more likely to be mentored than female workers. This is partly because men dominate managerial positions, but even when managers are female, they, too, tend to mentor male workers (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2006; Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011). In addition to differences in their job training and mentoring, the human capital approach also argues that women do not have the same levels of job experience. On average, women today have less work experience than men do, but the gap in experience is fast closing (Reskin and Padavic 1994). The scholars of this view argue that the job experience gap is typically due to women’s domestic and maternal obligations and often explained by interruptions in work due to childbirth and child-care obligations (Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011; Gottfried 2013). For example, these scholars argue that because of child-care responsibilities, women work shorter hours, take time off from work, or even opt for jobs and sectors that have more flexible hours and shorter shifts to balance work and family obligations (Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011; England and Folbre 2005; Gottfried 2013; Solberg and Laughlin 1995).

Pamela Stone, in her landmark book Opting Out? (2008), shows that high-income executive women feel they do not have child-care options and end up leaving their jobs mid-career because of a lack of family leave policies. In response to Lisa Belkin’s New York Times article “The Opt-Out Revolution” (2003), which argues that highly educated women are leaving high-paying, high-prestige jobs when they have children because they prefer more traditional gender roles of child care, Stone shows that these women did not really have a choice. Many were offered more money and more responsibilities but not given any time off or any time away from work that would allow them to fulfill parental duties while retaining their jobs.

To the extent that such career interruptions decrease the overall levels of job experience women have, it is expected to contribute to the pay gap. Taking time off from work also presents challenges for many female workers: when female workers try to return to the workforce after taking time off for child care, many face difficulty in finding jobs that offer their previous pay and benefits, to say nothing of the loss of promotion opportunities (P. Stone 2008). This is closely connected to the lack of parental and family leave policies in the United States. The workplace makes the implicit assumption that “the prototypical human being is a self-sufficient rational economic man”
Reproductive work and care work are defined as all activities focusing on the provisioning and caring for children and the elderly, including “caring, feeding, clothing, teaching, and nurturing individuals” (Parreñas 2008, 12). While these activities are essential to the growth of our society, as well as important components of our productive economy, our economy still is based on the assumption that all workers are care-free (Lynch 2010), and therefore we offer limited parental leave, especially compared with other industrialized countries (Gottfried 2013).

Overall, the human capital approach has been criticized because by focusing on individual factors, it ultimately blames the victim. This view believes that the problem lies with individual differences and, therefore, individual workers. However, despite high levels of labor-force participation and significantly greater educational attainment by women, gender inequalities persist (Charles 2003; Charles and Bradley 2009; Gottfried 2013). Similarly, this view has also been criticized because experience differences and labor-force interruptions are not the main culprit. Stephen Rose and Heidi Hartmann (2004), in their study of men and women who have remained in the workforce continuously for fifteen years, show that women earned fifty-seven cents on the dollar, much lower than the often-cited seventy-seven cents. Therefore, even when women did not leave the labor force, they did not achieve equality in pay (Gottfried 2013). Furthermore, the cost of leaving the workforce is not the same for men and women: women experienced harsher losses for transitioning in and out of the workforce (Fuller 2008). Overall, even after controlling for individual characteristics, a substantial portion of the pay gap still remains unexplained (Blau and Kahn 2006; Fuller and Schoenberger 1991; Goldin 1990; Groshen 1991; Paglin and Rufolo 1990; Schilt and Wiswall 2008; Wood, Corcoran, and Courant 1993).

The second set of explanations, the occupational segregation approach, shifts the focus from individual attributes to occupational characteristics. This view argues that men and women are paid differently because they work in different jobs (Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011; Reskin and Padavic 1994; Reskin and Roos 2002) with female-dominated jobs being lower-paying and lower-authority positions (England 2005, 2010; England and Folbre 2005). The effects of occupational segregation are not limited to the pay gap but can also reduce women’s fringe benefits, pensions, and social security income (Calasanti 2001). For example, Toni Calasanti’s (2001) quantitative work shows that because of accumulated inequality throughout the working years, what are considered the “golden years” of retirement are not as beneficial to women as they are to men.

Historically, since the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the cash economy, jobs have been sex segregated (England 2005, 2010; England and
Folbre 2005; Goldin 1990; Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009). In the United States, occupational sex segregation, based on an index from 0 to 100, with higher values representing more segregation, fluctuated little between 1910 (69.0) and 1970 (67.6). However, the gender revolution of the 1970s led to a sudden drop in the index, which reached 59.8 by 1980 (Jacobs 1989). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the gap kept narrowing, but it has been stagnant since (Davis and Gould 2015). Despite some progress, men and women still work in different sectors in different industries and hold different jobs (Bielby and Baron 1986; Charles 2003; Charles and Bradley 2009; Hegewisch and Williams 2013; Reskin and Padavic 1994; Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009). While the decline over time in the sex-segregation index is a welcome change, not all of it comes from women entering traditionally male jobs. The decline in the 1960s mostly stemmed from men’s entry into traditionally female jobs (Reskin and Hartmann 1986). By the 1970s, women started moving into traditionally male jobs (Gottfried 2013). Especially with changing laws, affirmative action, and regulations that bar discrimination, women started entering many traditionally male sectors, such as broadcast reporting, bank management, and bartending (Reskin and Roos 2002). This was also bolstered by job growth in some sectors and the absence of qualified male workers in other sectors, allowing women workers to enter traditionally male fields.

Despite changes, the majority of men and women today still work in sex-segregated jobs (Charles 2003; Charles and Bradley 2009; England 2005, 2010; England and Folbre 2005; Gottfried 2013; Hegewisch and Williams 2013; Padavic and Reskin 2002). Because of sex segregation, women end up with lower pay and benefits because industries that employ mostly women tend to offer lower pay (Aldrich and Buchele 1989; Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1980; Blau 1977; Coverdill 1988; England 2005, 2010; England and Folbre 2005; Ferber and Spaeth 1984; Hodson and England 1986). Typically referred to as the androcentric pay scale (Wade and Ferree 2015), jobs in which women are concentrated typically pay 5 percent to 21 percent less than jobs in which men are concentrated (Cohen and Huffman 2007). Once a job becomes dominated by female workers, it comes to be considered a woman’s job, and the overall pay declines substantially (Gottfried 2013).

As Christine Williams (1992) shows in her study of male nurses, as men enter traditionally female industries such as nursing, not only do they get paid more and have higher opportunities of advancement, but the overall pay of the industry goes up. By the same token, as women enter traditionally masculine fields, not only do they face discrimination and sexual harassment (Kanter [1977] 1993; see also Yoder and Aniakudo 1997), but the overall wages decrease (Gottfried 2013; Reskin and Roos 2002). Psychologists Lynn
Liben, Rebecca Bigler, and Holleen Krogh (2001) also show that male occupations are associated with higher status than women’s jobs. They presented ten- and eleven-year-olds with the fake occupations “clipster” (person who tests batteries) and “heigist” (a person who ensures water quality). When the children were told that these jobs were performed by men, the children gave these jobs a higher status ranking. Similar studies of college students confirm that the perceived prestige of the job increases if it is performed by a male worker. Jobs performed predominantly by women are not just lower in prestige, but they also are assumed to require fewer skills and be easier to perform (Hochschild 1983).

Sex segregation is not just on the industry level: even within the same industry there is sex segregation on the corporate level. Francine Blau (1977), for example, shows that in male-dominated occupations (such as accounting clerk, payroll clerk, or computer programmer), men outearn their counterparts because they work for higher-paying firms, while women are concentrated in lower-paying firms. Research also shows that women tend to be concentrated more in part-time jobs (England and Folbre 2005), while men are concentrated in full-time jobs (Blackburn et al. 2002; Gottfried 2013) with higher rates of moving in and out of the workforce (Fuller 2008). Therefore, even within the same job, women tend to be concentrated in more part-time jobs, not necessarily performing much fewer duties but getting paid substantially less, with fewer benefits and limited advancement opportunities.

Similarly, there is also sex segregation within job assignments. For example, women tend to be concentrated in nonmanagerial jobs, while men are overrepresented in managerial jobs (Kimmel 2015; Lorber 1994). This is also highly correlated with biases in perceptions of what makes a “good manager.” Research shows that many qualities that are sought in a manager are traditionally masculine. However, recent research on women managers shows that when they exhibit such traditionally masculine characteristics, their evaluations decrease substantially. The same actions that are considered to be decisive leadership skills for men are evaluated negatively for women. Female managers are expected to be nice, caring, and nurturing, but when they do display these traditionally feminine qualities, they are often seen as less assertive (Kimmel 2015). A study of college professors shows that female professors get lower evaluations from students when they show leadership and authority (Boring, Ottobani, and Stark 2016). Anne Boring, Kellie Ottobani, and Philip Stark’s research of student evaluations shows systematic and statistically significant bias against female instructors in student evaluations of teaching. Based on 23,001 student evaluations of 379 instructors by 4,423 students in six mandatory first-year courses in a five-year natural experiment at a French university, as well as on 43 student evaluations for four
sections of an online course in a randomized, controlled, blind experiment at an American university, the research team shows systematic bias against female instructors. The bias against female faculty is reflected not only in their lower ratings but even in students’ perceptions of seemingly objective and tangible actions, such as grading and returning assignments in a timely manner. This is especially important because these student evaluations of teaching are used in decisions of tenure and promotions.

On top of all this, women who are mothers face a motherhood wage penalty when applying for positions, as well as in their wages (Budig and England 2001). Overall, men outpace women in both male- and female-dominated jobs, creating a promotion gap as men advance at a faster pace (Padavic and Reskin 2002; Valian 1999). As a result, men tend to be clustered in higher-paying occupations and in managerial positions with greater pay, autonomy, and authority and more opportunities for advancement (Bose and Bridges-Whaley 2011; Budig 2002; England and Folbre 2005; Padavic and Reskin 2002; Reskin and Roos 2002; Schilt and Wiswall 2008).

A third view looks at differences in attitudes and values between men and women and explains the pay gap as a result of their differential work-related values and motivations (Fortin 2008). These differences occur because parents, peers, teachers, and the media socialize men and women into gendered values and behaviors from a very young age (Marini 1989; Subich et al. 1989; Kimmel 2000; Schilt and Wiswall 2008). Such early socialization might result in differential occupational choices for men and women: women might be encouraged to choose helping and nurturing professions to reinforce feminine traits, while men might be encouraged to choose higher-paying and higher-authority jobs to reinforce masculine traits (Kimmel 2000; Schilt and Wiswall 2008).

This view argues that men and women value different things in the workplace and their reasons for working differ substantially: men value making more money and having more authority, while women value social benefits (Reskin and Padavic 1994; Farrell 2005). The gender wage gap, in this view, has less to do with the actions of employers and more with how men and women are socialized. However, research by Ronnie Steinberg (1990) has conclusively rejected these claims and has demonstrated that men and women do not value different things at work. However, in the recent years, especially with the slowdown of the closing of the wage gap, there has been a renewal in interest in this strand of work (Blau and Kahn 2004; Fortin 2008). With renewed interest in differences in attitudes, new studies explore gender differences in values and motivations (Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne 2001; Fortin 2008).
Similarly, these scholars have argued that men and women do not show the same levels of job commitment: female workers are not as committed to their jobs as their male counterparts, and as a result they are not as productive (Reskin and Padavic 1994), limiting their value to the employer and, thus, their pay. Despite these claims, male and female workers show similar levels of productivity. However, male workers are more likely to receive tools to increase productivity in the workplace (Reskin and Padavic 1994). In the context of agricultural modernization, for instance, male agricultural workers have monopolized modern equipment and methods to increase their productivity, leaving more manual agricultural jobs to women (Boserup 1970).

In addition, many studies have found that male and female workers actually show similar levels of job commitment (Bielby and Bielby 1988; Gottfried 2013; Rose and Hartmann 2004). What affects commitment to jobs and productivity is not the sex of the worker but factors such as working conditions, job autonomy, and promotion opportunities. In fact, women show more commitment to jobs than men do at the same levels of job autonomy (Bielby and Bielby 1988). The assumption that job commitment is equally rewarded for both men and women is also problematic, as the social meaning of “job commitment” is not the same for both genders, and men and women are not rewarded in the same fashion. Rose and Hartmann’s (2004) study of job commitment shows that even when women show the same level of strong labor attachment and work commitment, they are paid significantly less than men are.

Youth Labor in America

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 sets the minimum age of work as sixteen. However, depending on the type and intensity of the work, fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds can work, especially in retail and service sector jobs. Nevertheless, freelance work often starts as early as twelve, with adolescents babysitting, shoveling snow, and doing yard work (Herman 2000).

Today, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016), the labor-force participation for all youth ages sixteen through twenty-four was 60.1 percent in July 2016. This is much lower than the youth employment rates of previous years; the youth labor-force participation rate peaked in 1989 at 77.5 percent. Despite the decline, which is seemingly tied to the aftereffects of 2008’s economic downturn, youth labor-force participation rates are still very high, with many working and many still looking for work. Also, of course, youth employment during the summer months is also much higher than employment rates during the school year. Currently, youth labor-force participation
rates are much higher for white youth (62.3 percent) than African American youth (56.4 percent), Asian youth (44.6 percent) and Hispanic youth (56.3 percent).

In addition, the labor-force participation for young men (61.8 percent) is also slightly higher than that of women (58.2 percent). The largest sector of employment for young workers is leisure and hospitality (25 percent), within which youth work is concentrated in restaurant services, with 18 percent working in retail. While retail and service sectors are the most dominant categories, smaller portions of youth are employed in agriculture (6 percent) and construction and manufacturing (12 percent).

Overall, despite the bouts of unemployment experienced by youth after the recent economic recession, young people’s labor-force participation still remains high, and they constitute 4 percent of our overall workforce (Hirschman and Voloshin 2007). In addition, work is also a socially and developmentally important component of American youth’s lives, providing young people with social space and a common vocabulary with which to relate to their peers, meet new people and socialize with friends, and help establish their identities (Besen-Cassino 2014). Even though youth employment has always been part of American culture, it has only emerged as a topic of sociological inquiry in the 1970s. In the 1970s, emerging studies started to document the prevalence of youth employment historically (Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson 2000).

In the second wave of research, during the 1980s, studies started focusing on the benefits of part-time work. This wave of research argued that part-time work helps young people find jobs in the future (D’Amico and Baker 1984; Stephenson 1980; Stern and Nakata 1989; see also Creed, Muller, and Patton 2003; Leventhal, Graber, and Brooks-Gunn 2001; Marsh and Kleitman 2005; Mortimer, Staff, and Oesterle 2003), reduces dropout rates (D’Amico and Baker 1984; McNeal 1997), improves school attendance (Marsh 1991; Mortimer and Finch 1986), and boosts academic performance (D’Amico and Baker 1984). According to these scholars, working while still in school has positive effects on both academic performance and future careers because it teaches important skills such as work ethic, discipline, and working with deadlines. They also find that working provides young people with a sense of accomplishment, making the transition to adulthood smoother. However, D’Amico and Baker (1984) show that these positive effects are mostly experienced by non-college-bound youth, with college-bound youth not experiencing the same benefits.

The optimism of scholars in the 1980s was followed by the third wave of research, which focused on the negative effects of employment for young people. These researchers found that part-time work lowers academic success,
especially if teenagers work over twenty hours per week (Marsh 1991; Mortimer and Finch 1986; Steinberg and Dornbusch 1991; Steinberg, Fegley, and Dornbusch 1993). More recently, Herbert Marsh and Sabina Kleitman (2005) found that working had several negative outcomes, especially on achievement scores, grades, attendance, and educational aspirations.

Working also interferes with emotional development: working long hours, in particular, is linked to lower mental health indicators, including depression and lower self-esteem (Greenberger and Steinberg 1986; Marsh and Kleitman 2005); reduces interactions with family and friends (Finch et al. 1991; Greenberger and Steinberg 1986; Mihalic and Elliot 1997; Paternoster et al. 2003); and increases the likelihood of risky behavior, such as substance abuse (McMorris and Uggen 2000; Mihalic and Elliot 1997; Steinberg, Fegley, and Dornbush 1993) and crime (Hansen and Jarvis 2000).

Researchers in this era also started looking at work in a more nuanced fashion, taking into account the intensity of work and the number of hours young people spend working. When they take into account these factors, they find that working lowers academic success and decreases the likelihood of finishing high school. Noah Lewin-Epstein (1981), for example, shows that working more than nineteen and a half hours per week has detrimental effects on academic progress, as work takes time away from academic studies. Similarly, by taking into account both the number of hours worked and the intensity of work, Ellen Greenberger and Laurence Steinberg (1986) find that working interferes with emotional and psychological development during the teenage years because it takes time away from peers, family, and extracurricular activities.

Working can also have potentially negative effects on risky behaviors, such as crime and drug and alcohol use. However, the direction and magnitude of these effects are much debated in the literature. Barbara McMorris and Christopher Uggen (2000), for example, show that working increases alcohol use but that the effects are short-lived and do not translate into higher alcohol use in adult years. Sharon W. Mihalic and Delbert Elliot (1997), on the other hand, find that students who work in high school are more likely to consume alcohol and marijuana even over the long term, when they are twenty-seven and twenty-eight. David M. Hansen and Patricia Jarvis (2000) bring in another factor, showing that where students work matters in predicting risky behavior: they find that youth who work in family businesses are less likely to engage in risky behavior.

In more recent years, the research on youth employment has moved away from looking at the advantages and disadvantages of working and toward exploring inequalities in the workforce (Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson 2000). Rather than seeing employment as a static and equal experience for all youth,
today’s research focuses on the context and conditions of working (Entwisle, Alexander, and Olson 2000). In addition, bourgeoning studies problematize inequalities and different levels of access to jobs based on race and socioeconomic status. These contemporary inquiries move away from evaluating effects of work on passive subjects but, rather, see young people as active agents of their own lives (Besen-Cassino 2014; Liebel 2004).

In this book, as a response to this emerging research focusing on inequalities in the adolescent workforce, I explore the lived experience of gender inequality from the perspectives of the central actors: young people themselves. I aim to uncover when gender inequality emerges in early employment, identify the factors that contribute to gender inequality, identify the mechanisms through which these inequalities are reinforced in everyday lives, and show how these early inequalities are translated into gender inequity in the adult workforce.