Since returning to power in 2010, Hungary’s Fidesz-controlled government has advocated aggressively for a nationalist agenda. The hate-filled messages have targeted the Jews, Romas, and Muslims. The rhetoric is by no means a dog whistle. It has been matched by policies—including the development of a 110-mile-long electric fence on its southern border (Dunai 2015)—and outright debates with German chancellor Angela Merkel (LB 2013; Vaskor 2018), European parliament member Guy Verhofstadt (24.hu 2018; J. Barnes 2018), and European Commissioner Jean Claude Junker (Bravo 2018; Kálmán 2018; Perring 2018) over the European Union’s refugee resettlement programs.

Given this hostility, it is somewhat surprising that one of the biggest migrant groups in the country (i.e., the Chinese) remains positive about Hungary. Large numbers of the Chinese continue to engage voluntarily with the authorities. Likewise, many of them report positive involvement with the locals. And, in fact, some show a predisposition toward identifying with the Hungarians. As we see in Table 1.1, these positive patterns—from trusting the police to trusting the locals—have remained consistent over time. What explains these numbers for the Chinese migrants in Hungary?

This book is about the political incorporation of migrants broadly—from their engagement with local authorities to their civic involvement to their identification with the host country. While the empirics draw heavily on the Chinese in Hungary and neighboring states, the argument is certainly neither
migrant group-specific nor region-focused. Instead, the implications are pressing given two ongoing developments—globally and locally.

The first is about the unprecedented movement of people. In the post–World War II era, we have witnessed an increasing number of migrants—from 78 million in 1960 to 258 million in 2017. And this growth promises to continue: In a recent Gallup poll conducted in 135 countries, almost 20 percent of the respondents said they would like to live permanently in a different country (see Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets 2014). While the developed countries have absorbed a large proportion of these migrants, the movement is not always in a south-north (or east-west) direction. In fact, half of the global migration happens strictly in the developing world (Adida 2014). As countries become increasingly diverse, the challenge is for community leaders, policy makers, and researchers to identify how best to incorporate these (relative) newcomers into the political fold.

The second development is about the escalating, far-reaching anti-immigration prejudice in recent years. The Trump administration was unforgiving in its attacks—from the Muslim travel ban (R. Barnes and Marimow 2018; National Public Radio 2017) to the family separation policy at the Mexico border (Barajas 2018; Raff 2018). In Britain, xenophobia drove the passage of the Brexit referendum (Gabbatiss 2017)—which, in turn, has contributed to the doubling of hate crimes (Weaver 2018). And, in Australia, the Labor Party has strongly enforced a boat turn back policy; it has also rejected demands for reforms to their offshore detention sites (Karp 2018).

By no means are these developments specific to the Anglo-speaking world: We see growing anti-immigration rhetoric globally from France (BBC News 2018; Semotiuk 2018) to Japan (Masuzoe 2018; N. Smith 2017), from Slovenia (Novak 2018) to Chile (Mujica 2018). Given this global hostility, it is imperative that we understand how migrants are responding to the political challenge.

To account for the political incorporation of migrants, scholars have typically focused on either the individual migrant or the host country (whether nationally or locally). In this book, I shift the unit of analysis to the migrant’s network. There are two types of networks. The first type is—in Robert Putnam’s (2000) parlance—a bonding network. These networks are characterized by their ethnolinguistic homogeneity—that is, the intraethnic

**TABLE 1.1 POLITICAL INCORPORATION OF THE CHINESE IN HUNGARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Affirmative</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust the Police</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust the Locals</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
engagement (Varshney 2003). In contrast, the second type is a bridging network. In these networks, the defining feature is the ethnolinguistic diversity—that is, the interethnic engagement. Whether a migrant is situated in a bonding or a bridging network depends not on where they are from—although it is certainly important. Instead, it is about the individual migrant’s linguistic repertoire vis-à-vis the linguistic landscape of the migrant community at large in the host country.

This chapter is divided into the following parts. First, I offer a generalized theory about how the language of migrant networks affects migrant political incorporation. Then I discuss the concept of political incorporation—and how in this book I focus on nonelectoral dimensions other than voting, running for office, and naturalizing. In the third section, I preview the empirical motivations—why I focus on the Chinese in Central-Eastern Europe. The attention on this migrant group and this region is both methodologically driven and empirically motivated. In the fourth part, I identify the distinct contributions of this book. And I conclude with the outline for the rest of the book.

Languages and Migrant Networks

When migrants arrive in a new destination, they often require assistance. This assistance can include finding lodging and a job. It can also include navigating the host country’s bureaucratic maze—from securing the legal residency permit to obtaining a local mobile number. And it can include providing critical information on how to deal with the local police—from the public transportation ticket inspectors to the foot patrol cops: Which ones are to be avoided? Which ones can be bribed (if bribery were possible)? What is the going rate for a bribe? Here, brokers can provide the necessary assistance. And, by joining a network, migrants have access to other migrants—often via these brokers.

However, not all networks are the same. Moreover, not all networks are available to all migrants. Networks can be differentiated based on the language used. When the language is spoken only by a select group of migrants, the network is characterized by high barriers to entry. It is considered bonding. It is difficult—if not outright impossible—for most migrants to simply join. But, for those who can join, these networks offer the homogeneity of fellow coethnics and high-quality brokers who are able to provide the necessary set of goods, services, and information. Conversely, if the language is widely spoken by many migrants, the entry barriers are much lower. Here, I consider these networks to be bridging. For these networks, there is ease in joining. And, as a result, we see more diversity in the membership and in broker quality.
The type of migrant network (i.e., whether it is bonding or bridging) affects with whom the migrants interact regularly and the quality of brokers available. Those in bonding networks are more likely to find themselves among coethnics. Because of the high linguistic barrier, those who cannot speak the language are kept out of the network. Additionally, because of the intraethnic engagement, the brokers tend to be of higher quality. The shared ethnic bond means there is greater homogeneity in preferences (i.e., cultural idiosyncrasies). An Arab broker will understand why fellow Arabic-speaking (Muslim) migrants would prefer not to work in a pork slaughterhouse. And, conversely, a Vietnamese broker will understand why fellow Vietnamese-speaking migrants are okay with living near the pork butcher. There is also another reason why brokers in bonding networks are usually of high quality. These brokers have a reputation based on a selective constituency. Their reputation extends back to their home country. Failure to address a problem—any problem—can ruin the broker’s credibility. As a result, these brokers have greater incentives to go the extra mile to attend to the migrants in their networks.

In contrast, those in the bridging networks are more likely to encounter diversity. There are two types of diversity here. One is about the diversity of fellow migrants in the network. Because the barriers to entry are low, technically anyone who can more or less speak the language can enter the network. This would include the locals who have learned the language as well. We also see more diversity in the number and quality of brokers. Since each individual broker attends to more clients—and thus in a more cursory fashion—they are less inclined to go above and beyond. But, in this situation, the migrant can also employ the services of a second or third broker. If diversity is good for participation (Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Leighley 1990; Mutz 2002, 2006; Scheufele et al. 2004; Welborne et al. 2018) and engagement (Bobo 1988; Oliver and Wong 2003; Varshney 2003), all else being equal, I contend migrants situated in bridging networks have higher levels of political incorporation.

But migrants—and their networks—do not operate in a political vacuum. Government policies—both positive and negative, intentional and unintentional—can disrupt the equilibrium between migrants, their peers, and their brokers. Here, what is important is the strength of these relationships. Stronger relationships can better withstand shocks than weaker ones. I argue that when there is a shock to these networks, migrants in the bridging networks are more vulnerable—for better or worse. There are two reasons why this is the case. First, because bridging networks are inherently more diverse, in times of stress, it is easier for people to finger point. Those in the out-group—even if they were previously neighbors and members of the same in-group—are suddenly viewed as a threat. Accusations of who is
a rat become widespread. In contrast, in bonding networks, this sudden us/them demarcation is less likely to manifest. The second reason why migrant network types matter in times of shock has to do with the broker. Brokers in bonding networks incur much greater costs if they cannot help their migrants weather the storm. Their reputation travels back to the home country. If they develop a reputation as being a subpar broker, their position becomes compromised. In contrast, brokers in the bridging networks do not face these constraints—or, at least, not to the same degree. As long as there is a steady stream of new migrants, these brokers will always be in demand.

In this book, I contend that the variations we see in political incorporation among the Chinese community have little to do with the migrants being Chinese or the identity of the host country. Instead, an important driver of political incorporation is the migrant’s network. Specifically, is the network bonding or bridging? A migrant’s linguistic repertoire—and not their passport cover—determines which network they can join. The network type will affect with whom they interact regularly and the quality of their broker. These experiences are important in shaping a migrant’s political incorporation—both before and after governments adopt policies that affect migrant communities.

The Political Incorporation of Migrants

Political incorporation is about the participation and representation of minority groups. It is about minorities becoming a “part of mainstream political debates, practices, and decision making” (Bloemraad 2006, 6). From a normative standpoint, political incorporation is important. It shapes the political landscape, both descriptively (i.e., who is in office) and substantively (i.e., what policies are passed). It shapes the political landscape from the national level (e.g., Congress) to the local level (e.g., city council). And it shapes the political landscape not just in the present but also in the future: Parents wield substantial influence on the political participation of their children (Bloemraad 2006).

There are a couple of trends that punctuate the literature on political incorporation. The first is the dominance of the American case. This is not wholly surprising. The literature emerged in large part as a response to the African-American community. The historical oppression of Blacks (Hol linger 2003) warranted attention on how best to understand and engage with the minority group. The theories generated from these studies would subsequently spawn other research agendas—whether for studying different minority groups in the United States (e.g., Hajnal and Lee 2011; Oliver and Wong 2003) or those in other countries (e.g., Maxwell 2010; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). However, often, these findings have been limited
One reason is because of differing levels of group consciousness. While African-Americans share high levels of linked fate—not surprising given their history—the same cannot be said for Hispanics in the United States or Muslims in Western Europe—two minority groups with panethnic identities.

Another trend in the political incorporation literature is the focus on the electoral aspects—whether it is about voting (see Hajnal and Lee 2011), winning office (see Bloemraad 2006), or naturalizing (Bueker 2005). Voting is a hallmark of democracy: It is a vehicle for ensuring minorities have descriptive representation; it is also, at a minimum, what ensures that minorities have substantive representation (Williams 1998). This emphasis on the electoral aspects of political incorporation is limited on multiple fronts. First, when generalizing beyond the African-American community, voting and running for office are not always available options to other groups. To be able to vote presupposes the minority is a citizen. Likewise, to be able to run for office requires citizenship. But not all minorities (i.e., migrants) have citizenship. To assume a migrant community is not politically incorporated because they have not voted or do not have representatives in office—without considering why they cannot vote or run for office—ignores an important part of the story.

While voting, running for office, and acquiring citizenship are important, political incorporation can manifest and be observed through nonelectoral channels. For example, people can protest—whether by joining a demonstration or participating in a strike. Likewise, people can take advantage of the political institutions at the local level—engaging with city council, the police, or the school board. And people can sign petitions, knock on doors, and solicit signatures for those petitions. Political incorporation can also include civic engagement—trusting those in the majority group, helping them, and working with them to involve the political institutions. In fact, voting and other types of political participation cannot manifest in the absence of civic engagement (see Gleason 2001; Putnam 1995; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). And finally, political incorporation can also include attitudes and identification (see Branton 2007; Pantoja 2005; Tate 2010): Do individuals see themselves as members of a state? When individuals perceive a disconnect between themselves and the state, political incorporation is hindered (see Huebert and Liu 2017; Huo et al. 1996).

In this book, I shift the attention away from voting. The motivation is twofold. One is practical. While the Chinese are one of the largest migrant groups in Europe, the majority have not naturalized. For many, there is a legal constraint—from Beijing. China does not allow dual citizenship. Forfeiting the Chinese citizenship and then naturalizing to a European one means needing a visa when going back to China to visit relatives. And, at
this point, there is always the risk that the Chinese embassy will deny the
visa application. At the same time, for many, what makes the European
citizenship attractive is not the right to vote but rather the freedom of move-
ment—across the continent. This freedom, however, is not contingent on
citizenship. In fact, being a permanent resident of a European Union state—
especially one in the Schengen Zone—affords similar luxury.

I also shift the attention away from voting for a normative reason. If the
Chinese are one of the largest migrant groups in Europe, it is important that
we understand the extent of their political incorporation beyond the act of
voting. Marking a piece of paper and dropping it into a box once every few
years tells us very little. Instead, we need to know about their engagement
with other nonelectoral political institutions, about their interactions with
the locals, and under what conditions they identify with the host country.

The Chinese in Central-Eastern Europe

The Chinese community offers an empirical advantage for testing the argu-
ment. In some ways, it is a natural experiment. On the one hand, the Chi-
inese—specifically the Hans—constitute one “ethnic” group. There are
shared descent-based attributes including skin color and language (Chan-
dra 2006; also see Ostwald 2018; Selway 2015). And, in general, the Chinese
language is written with the same orthography. There is a distinction be-
tween traditional and simplified writing. And while there are important
differences between the two orthographies, the overlap between the two is
as high as 75 percent (Yao 2017). Additionally, most Chinese people can
speak Mandarin. Yet, this does not guarantee that the boundaries of the
Chinese migrant network are congruent with those of China—the country.

There are three scenarios to consider.

First, the networks can be subnational. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, Man-
darin is widely spoken throughout China as a mother tongue—from the
northern to the western provinces. Of the three different types of Manda-
rin—that is, “common talk” (putonghua)—it is the northern version that
reigns supreme. The “northern talk” (beifanghua) is the one designated as
official. It is used from the courtrooms to the classrooms, from the board-
rooms to the broadcasting studios. When Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivers
a speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations, it is in northern
talk. And among the different varieties of Mandarin, there is a high level of
intelligibility (M. Lewis, Simons, and Fenning 2016). In contrast, for people
coming from the south (e.g., Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang), their moth-
er tongues are mutually unintelligible from Mandarin. Moreover, these
mother tongues are mutually unintelligible with each other. As an example,
consider the sentence, “Have a look, what is this?” In Chinese, this sentence
你看, 这是什么?

Yet when it comes to speaking, how one would properly pronounce the sentence would depend on where one is:

**Beijing Municipality** (*Putonghua*, i.e., Mandarin)
“Ni kan, zhe shi shen me?”

**Fujian Province** (*Min*; e.g., Fujianese)
“Li kua’ng, zei xi xia’ng?”

**Guangdong Province** (*Yue*; e.g., Cantonese)
“Nei tai, ni go hai mat ye lei?”

**Shanghai Municipality** (*Wu*, e.g., Shanghainese)
“Non kui, zui sai sa me zi?”

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From the above example, we see clear evidence of variations in the pronunciation across the different Chinese mother tongues. Thus, if a migrant network were based on a southern vernacular (e.g., Fujianese), this effectively bars the Chinese from the other regions—even fellow southerners—from joining. Under such conditions, this migrant network is subnational in character and is considered bonding.

Second, a migrant network can be transnational. Mandarin is the lingua franca for most ethnic Hans (Kaplan and Baldauf 2003; Ostler 2006). In fact, 70 percent of Chinese language users speak Mandarin as a first language; and, for those who speak Mandarin as a second language, literacy in Mandarin is at 91 percent (M. Lewis, Simons, and Fenning 2016). This is the case not just across the Chinese provinces but globally as well. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, Mandarin is not only the official language of China but also of Taiwan and Singapore—the only other two countries in the world where the Han Chinese are the numerical majority (98 percent and 74 percent, respectively). And in countries with sizable Chinese populations and where Chinese children can learn Chinese in schools (e.g., Malaysia and Australia), it is Mandarin that is taught. In short, anyone who can speak Mandarin can join this network—regardless of their provincial and national origins. Even nonethnic Chinese who have studied the language can be part of the network: The Chinese language classes offered to foreigners through the Confucius...
Institutes globally are in Mandarin (Kim et al. 2015; D. Lien, Oh, and Selmiyer 2012). Under such conditions, this migrant network is transnational in character and bridging.

Third, a migrant network can also be transnational—but with a different lingua franca as the language of the network. For any network, there must be a critical migrant mass. Consider that there are four Chinese migrants in a community. While four is enough to play a game of mahjong (Chinese rummy), it is not practical to form a network—whether in a southern provincial vernacular or Mandarin. Instead, it may behoove them to link up with other non-Hans. It can be either with other Asian migrants (e.g., Turkish or Vietnamese) or even with the local minorities (e.g., Romas). Regardless, this network is by definition transnational. For this transnational network to exist, however, there must be a lingua franca that transcends these different groups. In this situation, it cannot be Mandarin. Instead, the one common denominator is the local Central-Eastern European language. Here, in this case, the Central-Eastern European language is considered a lingua franca—as opposed to a hegemonic language—because it is the language of interethnic communication and where notably none of the ethnic groups are from the local majority.

Contributions

This book makes multiple contributions, and, as such, it is of relevance to multiple bodies of literature. Two of the contributions have to do with concept—specifically, that of the migrant network. By focusing on the language of the migrant network, this book allows us to appreciate the variation in network boundaries. We can understand why some networks are subnational in their structure. In a groundbreaking work, a group of anthropologists and sinologists (Frank Pieke, Pál Nyíri, Mette Thunø, and Antonella Ceccago) studied families from two villages in Fujian, China, who moved to different corners of Europe—and then back to China. In the book, Pieke et al. (2004) noted that even migrants from the same province can speak mutually unintelligible dialects. Moreover, in Europe, these networks can often provide the necessary links to pull migrants out of China. And, because of the density of the networks, migrants in these networks can be self-sufficient upon arriving in Europe. Two comments merit discussion. First, not all migrants—even those from dense networks—speak sufficiently unintelligible language that can effectively keep out all other migrants. Second, even if a migrant could speak such a distinct vernacular, networks require local contacts as well. And the type of contacts in the host country will depend on who else is also there.
In contrast to the work by Pieke et al. (2004)—one rich in details but narrow in focus—there are scholars that look at migrants classified by national units (see P. Lien 2007; Liu 2020) or broad transnational regions (see Dancygier 2017; Maxwell 2010; Oliver and Wong 2003). Whether it is appropriate to focus on these networks alone on the context, namely, what other migrants are around. If the home country is a homogeneous unit and there is a sizable community in the host country—it can be adequate. But, if the migrant communities are tiny, each pocket of distinctiveness may need to come together collectively in a more transnational network.

The other conceptual contribution has to do with the migrants themselves. While there have been no shortage of studies focusing on migrants and their linguistic proficiency in the host language—or the lack thereof (see Chiswick and Miller 1996)—these works frequently ignore or downplay how migrants may have a multilingual repertoire that includes other languages (for an exception, see Adida 2014; Laitin 1988). The different languages that a migrant can speak allows them to join different networks—even if a network does not match up with their passport cover. Moreover, even if the migrant has a weak command of the host language, this does not mean they cannot use it as a language of interethnic communication (i.e., a lingua franca) with other migrants from different backgrounds.

This book also makes two theoretical contributions. First, while the migration literature has shown repeatedly the importance of migrant networks, we know little about how these networks vary. There is often a coethnics broker who renders the necessary services. And there are often neighbors who can help as well. However, because these works are often based on the detailed study of one network, we are left assuming these brokers and neighbors are uniform in their resourcefulness. And, if they are not, the distribution is simply randomly assigned. Yet, this cannot be the case. Some brokers—like those mentioned in Pieke et al. (2004)—exhibit high levels of resourcefulness. Their concern is not simply about helping a migrant in the moment. Instead, there are also the long-term reputation costs back home and with future arriving migrants. Other brokers are more hands-off: They simply pass along information about available jobs—for example, for English-speaking West Indians (Kaufman 2000).

Related to the brokers is also the characteristics of the other people in the network. Again, as we know from Pieke et al. (2004), in some instances, the network is saturated not just with coethnics but with migrants who all know each other—or are of the same people back home. In these cases, there may be a strong incentive to help the neighbor. In contrast, in other instances, the network may simply be a collection of migrants who are able to
communicate in the same language and who have shared similar experiences. But the extent of them helping each other out is limited—some more so than others. In short, these distinctions matter for how migrant networks function. When a network employs a language that is not spoken widely, the barriers are considered high. As such, migrants in these bonding networks and their brokers tend to share ascriptive characteristics. In contrast, when the language of a migrant network is widely spoken, the network is considered bridging. Anyone who can speak the language can enter.

The second theoretical contribution is that by focusing on the networks as equilibriums between migrants and other migrants, between migrants and brokers, and between brokers and the local authorities, this book brings in the host country. Specifically, it makes theoretical arguments about how migrant networks—based on their type—respond to government policies that target migrants. These policies need not always be negative (from the perspective of the migrants), like eradicating immigrant “ghettos” in Denmark (Independent 2018; Perrigo 2018) or blocking migrant rescue ships from docking in Italy (T. Barnes 2018; Wintour 2018). They can also be positive (again, from the perspective of the migrants)—for example, accepting asylum applications without asking questions in Germany (Agence France-Presse 2015a) or incorporating migrant languages into the Taiwanese school curriculum (Adriana 2018; UNTV News and Rescue 2018). And these policies need not be intentional—they can be the by-product of another policy. We will see this in the Romanian case. And because these networks vary in their inherent structure, I can explain why some migrants are likely to feel the impact of a government policy more so than others.

This book also makes multiple empirical contributions. First, by focusing on the Chinese community, I can hold national origin (i.e., China) and ethnicity (i.e., Han) largely constant. This ensures that I am not comparing apples to oranges. But, at the same time, because of the extreme linguistic diversity in China coupled with the presence of a lingua franca across the larger Han-speaking world, I can leverage the differences between a Jonathan apple and a Granny Smith apple. This type of analysis—to the best of my knowledge—has never been done. Related, by focusing on the larger Chinese community, this book calls attention to a relatively new migrant community in Europe. Hitherto, the European migration literature—especially those employing statistical analyses—has focused heavily on the movement of people from the east—for example, the Bulgarians and Romanians in Spain (Bradatan and Sandu 2012; Elrick and Ciobanu 2009; Stanek 2009). Others have looked at South Asians (Maxwell 2010), Middle Easterners (Dancygier 2014, 2017), Turks (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004), and Africans (Adida, Laitin, and Valfort 2016). This book offers an important empirical insight into a community that warrants similar attention.
The empirical contributions are not simply about the Chinese migrants. They are also about the region of Central-Eastern Europe. Given the political history up until 1989, this region has not been a traditional destination for migrants—Chinese and others. But this has changed drastically. Whether it was because of the visa-free regime during the transition, the economic opportunities following the transition, or the liberal migration regime before the European Union expansion, the region—as the “last white man’s frontier”—has drawn large numbers of Chinese migrants. This book calls attention to the region in the Chinese overseas literature—a body of works that have focused traditionally on Southeast Asia, the Americas, and Australia. The regional contribution is not strictly for Chinese overseas scholars, however. Migration scholars—especially those focusing on Western Europe—have generally ignored the countries to the east. Yet, as the 2015 refugee crisis demonstrated, while places like Hungary and Serbia may not have the same draw as Germany and Sweden, they are important countries in the migration route.

Plan of the Book

Nine chapters follow this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 is the theory chapter. It begins with a conceptual discussion of migrant networks, noting that these networks need not always match up with the migrant’s passport cover. Sometimes a network can be subnational in character; other times, a network can be transnational. The chapter then identifies the two network types: bonding and bridging. It concludes by discussing how each network type affects a migrant’s political incorporation—and how it can moderate a government policy.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the Chinese in Central-Eastern Europe. First, it situates the community vis-à-vis other Chinese communities in the world, most notably in Southeast Asia, the Americas, and Australia. Next, it traces the two different paths the Chinese took to arrive in the region. Last, it discusses the common denominator across—and the unique characteristics of—the five sites included for this book: Hungary (Budapest), Romania (Bucharest), Serbia (Belgrade), Bulgaria (Sofia), and Croatia (Zagreb). While some of the information provided about these communities is drawn from secondary sources, the majority is based on original data.

Chapter 4 is the first of the empirical chapters. But before turning to the statistical evidence, I discuss the surveys and their designs. In this region, there has been a dearth of surveys on migrants, generally, and on the Chinese, specifically (for a notable exception, see Örkény and Székelyi 2010). In

1. Private conversation with Gary Freeman, Austin, TX (May 12, 2015).
fact, in some of the countries, my surveys were the first of their kind to have ever been done. Here, I pay special attention to when a network in one country is considered bonding, but in another country the same network is considered bridging—if it exists at all. The statistical results highlight the importance of network type in shaping political incorporation. Specifically, those situated in bridging ones have higher levels of political incorporation—whether it is about involving the political authorities, engaging the locals, or being civically minded.

Chapter 5 focuses on Hungary. The Hungarian case is an anomaly. On the one hand, the government has been espousing right-wing rhetoric and adopting nationalist policies. On the other hand, despite this hostility, political incorporation levels for the Chinese community have remained consistently high. I contend this paradox is because the Orbán administration has strategically omitted the Chinese from the larger anti-immigrant narrative; and, instead, the government has gone out of its way to foster closer ties with China—inclusive of its migrants. The result of this unusual arrangement is that the Chinese migrants behave very much like there is no ongoing attack on outsiders. We see this in the high levels of political incorporation—especially for the Chinese in the bridging networks—across three survey waves (2014, 2016, and 2018).

Chapter 6 looks at Romania, where an unexpected development proved to be a natural experiment. In 2015—shortly after I began administering the surveys—the Romanian government launched a nationwide initiative to collect back taxes. These efforts were in line with a European Union directive. But, instead, the Romanian government incurred the wrath of the Chinese. The negative attitudes resulted in the Chinese turning to the Chinese embassy for help. The Chinese ambassador responded by summoning Romanian officials for an explanation. Yet, I show that these loud, negative actions manifested primarily for those in the bridging networks—where feelings of betrayal were widespread and the brokers were not always helpful. In contrast, migrants in the bonding networks showed no significant changes in political incorporation levels.

While the evidence thus far suggests (linguistically demarcated) migrant network types matter for political incorporation, how generalizable is this argument? Chapter 7 is the first of two chapters to address this question. In this chapter, I focus on whether the empirical evidence is specific to the migrant group (i.e., the Chinese). To this end, I focus on another migrant community in Central-Eastern Europe: the Muslims, specifically, those from the Middle East and North Africa. Leveraging a unique feature of the Arabic language—much like that of the Chinese language—I demonstrate that the purported mechanisms linking the migrant network type to political incorporation are in no way Chinese-specific.
Chapter 8 shifts the attention on generalizability from the migrant group to the region. Is it possible that the observed effects are somehow idiosyncratic to Central-Eastern Europe? To assess this possibility, I use survey data of the Chinese community—once again, holding the migrant group constant—in Western Europe, namely, Portugal. The results tell a story that is consistent with what we saw in Central-Eastern Europe: Migrants embedded in bridging Mandarin networks have higher levels of political incorporation than their counterparts in bonding networks.

If contact between people of diverse backgrounds is important for political incorporation, the two final chapters take this conclusion as their point of departure. Chapter 9 shifts the attention away from the Chinese migrants per se; instead, it looks at Chinese migration from the perspective of the locals. Specifically, I examine public attitudes. I show that the locals are generally positive toward the Chinese—both spatially and temporally. More importantly, I also demonstrate how contact with the Chinese at the subnational, local level can have positive effects on attitudes.

Chapter 10 concludes the book by pivoting to the governments. It identifies a list of policy recommendations (i.e., best practices) for how governments can help better incorporate migrants. I begin with the assumption that host country governments prefer the Chinese migrants—any migrants—to be incorporated. These recommendations include promoting lingua francas among migrants, incentivizing dispersed settlements, and maintaining regularized, positive channels of communication with migrant community leaders.