Introduction

Emerging Threats to Human Rights

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In recent years the international community has faced challenges that threaten the enjoyment of human rights in new and dramatic ways. With global temperatures rising, access to clean water dwindling, and communities being forced to make trade-offs between individual human rights and the protection of natural environments (Anton 2011; Steady 2009), the natural world is imperiled like never before. Such widespread environmental degradation threatens the basic human rights of a large proportion of the world’s population. Populations in the Global South are particularly vulnerable to the effects of rising sea levels associated with climate change and to water pollution. When sea levels rise as a result of climate change, what will become of populations who call small island-nations their home? When water becomes too polluted to drink, where will communities go to secure new sources of fresh, drinkable water?

Beyond these challenges to our environment, which pose potentially catastrophic threats to the enjoyment of human rights on a large scale, the international community is facing a second threat, violence targeted at civilians. In September 2015 the lifeless body of a three-year-old Syrian refugee washed onto the shore of southern Turkey. Aylan Kurdi, his five-year-old brother, and his mother all died when the small boat they were on capsized en route to the Greek island of Kos. His father, Abdullah Kurdi, tried to save his family and explained that their dinghy hit large waves on the thirteen-mile journey down the Aegean, leading the trafficker whom he
had paid sixty-one hundred dollars for safe passage to jump off in the hopes of swimming to safety (“That Little Syrian Boy” 2015). The image of Aylan’s tiny body, face down in the waves, sparked outrage in the international community and a collective sense that something must be done to ease the suffering of the victims of state violence in Syria. Indeed, as rates of civil war and internal conflict have risen in the post–World War II period (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005), civilians find themselves choosing between remaining in their homes or fleeing in search of peace and a better life. Still other groups of people are persecuted by their own government for their race, religion, or other immutable characteristic. As migratory pressures have sparked xenophobic national responses, one particularly malicious human rights consequence has been government decisions to rescind or severely curtail citizenship for unpopular groups. In some cases, even when populations have resided in the country for centuries, government officials have decided to withdraw citizenship, leaving large groups of people without any form of official nationality documentation and rendering them stateless.

These threats to the environment and human security have been followed by record-breaking numbers of refugees, migrants, and stateless people. In 2016, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recorded the highest-ever number of forcibly displaced people—65.6 million (UNHCR 2017). In 2018 the UNHCR again recorded the highest-ever number of forcibly displaced people—68.3 million. This number includes both officially registered refugees (25.4 million) and the approximately 10 million stateless people who live in a legal limbo, denied access to citizenship and often to the most basic rights that citizenship confers (UNHCR 2018).

In bringing together scholars of resource dilemmas, violence, and citizenship, as well as lawyers and human rights practitioners, this book begins by identifying the core causes of human rights violations confronting our world today. The contributions collectively point to three significant and emerging causes of human rights violations: resource deprivation, violence, and the denial of nationality/citizenship. Though in some instances, which I discuss in subsequent sections, pairs of these topics are occasionally treated together, more often than not these topics are examined in isolation. One of the primary arguments this book advances is that there are novel insights to be gleaned through a careful examination of the intersections of these emerging threats to human rights. By dismissing the more traditional approaches to these topics and instead applying a human rights frame, this book sheds light on the important intersections between these issues. A second argument this book assesses is whether and to what extent these emerging threats to human rights serve as drivers of displacement.
Recent Patterns in Global Migration

People choose to leave or are forced to leave their homes for a variety of reasons. Some people leave their country of origin in the hope of finding better economic opportunities abroad, choosing to take their chances that they can provide better situations for themselves and their families. For others the desire to cross an international border is motivated by the need to find sources of clean water and arable farmland, resources that may no longer be available in their country of origin. Still others flee for their lives, with little more than the clothes on their backs, as violence engulfs their communities. Violence can shape flight when it emanates from the state—that is, the government is targeting citizens, using weapons of war against its own civilians. Or violence leading to emigration can result from rebels, terrorist groups, or drug cartels, nonstate actors who make the prospect of safety at home all but impossible to imagine. Still others choose to flee after long, slow government policies to rescind their rights because of religious or racial difference culminate in unlivable conditions. For some, a collapsing or failed state can motivate the desire to leave, as the government loses the ability to ensure basic protections for the population.

While none of these factors should be understood as new drivers of migration, and the phenomenon of human movement across state borders is similarly as old as the concept of borders themselves, what is new are the scope and scale of migration. At the end of 2016, 65.6 million people were displaced from their homes, an increase of 300,000 people from the year before (UNHCR 2017, 2). This number includes people displaced within their own country, internally displaced people (IDP), who make up 40.3 million of the figure reported for 2016. In 2016 the top three migrant-producing countries were Syria (5.5 million displaced people), Afghanistan (2.5 million), and South Sudan (1.4 million) (3).

Though the UNHCR’s work is focused on providing relief to refugees rather than other categories of migrants, its reports include data on stateless populations, groups that are of concern but fall short of the definition of refugees and asylum seekers (those who have yet to be designated as refugees but are seeking that status). A major challenge concerning stateless populations is that governments often do not know how large the populations of stateless migrants living within their borders really are. Without any formal method for counting these groups, even data obtained by the UNHCR are at best an approximation of the true population. The UNHCR estimates that there are 10 million stateless people, yet its data capture only 3.2 million, while the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (2014) suggests that the actual number of stateless people in the world is closer to 15 million. Groups in the “of concern” category do not meet the definition of refugee but may be...
former refugees, people in host countries displaced by refugees, or rejected asylum seekers (UNHCR 2017, 51). In 2016, there were more than 800,000 people in this category. The UNHCR reports that by the end of 2016, there were 2.8 million people awaiting asylum decisions (39).

International law treats classes of migrants very differently. For those who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted by their government, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) confers the possibility of asylum and refugee status in a host country. Political persecution is a very specific type of violation, and mere fear is generally not sufficient to meet this standard. In practice, for instance, this means that starvation resulting from state collapse would not trigger the protection of the refugee regime under international law. Migrants who flee in search of better economic opportunities or who migrate to eke out a living to avoid death are similarly not protected by international law. It would be erroneous, however, to crudely split the causes of migration, as Anna Lindley cautions against into two neat categories, “economic/voluntary” and “forced/political” (2014, 12). How, for example, can one characterize those who flee temporarily in response to a humanitarian disaster? Similarly, how should we label those who have been persecuted by their governments and who have lost their citizenship but for whom the UNHCR determines that their fear is short of well founded?

We take no normative position on whether flight is necessarily positive or negative as an end in and of itself, aiming not to fall victim to what Stephen Castles (2010) refers to as the sedentary bias in migration research—making the flawed assumption that all instances of human migration must be generated from crisis in one’s country of origin. This, he argues, leads to one of two approaches to migration, both of which imply that migration is dysfunctional and problematic. The first approach suggests that there are root causes of migration such as poverty that must be “solved” to stop emigration from countries of origin. The second approach prioritizes tighter border controls in host countries, implying that if the borders are secure, then problematic migration will cease (Castles 2010, 1567). Instead, this book examines whether and to what extent patterns of rights violations in the country of origin can be systematically linked to migration while recognizing that for a variety of situations migration occurs in the absence of human rights deprivations at home.

Examining the relationship between human rights violations in the country of origin and the likelihood of migration is emerging as an important area of inquiry within both international relations and migration studies. Because the 1951 Refugee Convention carves out such narrow rules surrounding the extension of refugee status, we apply Alexander Betts’s survival migration framework. Survival migrants are “people who are outside their
country of origin because of an existential threat for which they have no access to a domestic remedy or resolution. . . . It is based on the recognition that what matters is not privileging particular causes of movement but rather clearly identifying a threshold of fundamental rights which, when available in a country of origin, requires that the international community allow people to cross an international border and receive access to temporary or permanent sanctuary” (Betts 2013, 5).

Betts asks that, if a government is no longer willing or able to protect the civil, political, or economic social and cultural rights of its people, might the international community expand the set of legally recognized reasons for individuals to cross international borders? With our examination of deprivation of resources, violence, and citizenship, we aim to dig into sources of rights violations that may pose the sort of existential threat to which Betts ascribes the label “survival migrant.” He points to “new drivers of cross-border displacement,” including “generalized violence, environmental change, and food insecurity—and their interaction—which underpin a significant and growing proportion of cross-border displacement in many parts of the world” (Betts 2013, 2). In this book, we take up his call to examine some of these other drivers of displacement.

Yet these are not the same types of violations he examines; ours is a test of the generalizability of the existential threat concept outside Africa, from which he generates all of his case studies, and beyond the failed-state designation. We extend his analysis beyond a consideration of failed states because we can envision many situations in which existential threats to human rights occur in functioning regimes. The effects of climate change, which could generate these sorts of threats to basic human rights to life, livelihood, and security of person, are certainly occurring in stable, functioning regimes. This book examines three categories that we suggest are emerging as central threats to human rights—deprivation of resources, violence, and the denial of nationality/citizenship.

Resources

Climate change and environmental degradation pose enormous challenges to the enjoyment of many basic human rights. In spite of the UN General Assembly recognition in 2010 that the right to water and sanitation is a human right, more than 783 million people lack access to clean water. Roughly 90 percent of wastewater is untreated globally, and up to 80 percent of wastewater in the Global South flows into lakes, rivers, and coastal zones; thus, water pollution is a growing threat to the environment (Corcoran et al. 2010).

While the possibilities of entire islands sinking into the ocean or mass environmental migration are often raised in public discourse to dramatize
the human consequences of climate change and environmental degradation, in reality the human rights consequences of environmental degradation are more complex. For example, though micro-islands in the Pacific, such as Tuvalu, may indeed one day disappear as sea levels rise as a result of climate change, in the interim, populations living in Tuvalu experience coastal erosion, which creates internal population displacement as arable land shrinks, water resources dry up, and less land becomes habitable (McAdam 2012). In this way, human rights intersect with climate change in much subtler ways, causing people to be cut off from food and water supplies, disrupting agricultural practices, and potentially accelerating migration. In theory, human rights are imbued in all people as a consequence of their humanity and should not be conditioned by their nationality. In practice, this means that all people, regardless of gender, race, or ethnicity, have claims as rights holders to breathe clean air, to drink clean water, and to be consulted when states or corporations, as duty bearers, initiate projects that will affect people’s enjoyment of these rights. As each of the contributing chapters on resources lays bare, however, these forces have dramatically different effects on rights holders in the Global South.

For states in the Global South, the competing demands of development, environmental protection, and human rights are in constant tension (Cameron 2010; McShane et al. 2011). When a large proportion of a state’s population lives below the poverty line, government policies that favor economic growth and job creation may directly threaten preservation of natural resources. In this way the effects of climate change and environmental degradation may “compound pre-existing vulnerabilities” such as poor socioeconomic conditions, limited natural resources, and population growth (McAdam 2012, 10). When the Ecuadorian government permitted oil companies to drill and mine territory in the Amazon, the indigenous Sarakysus’ ability to maintain their traditional way of life was put in jeopardy. But at the same time, excessive environmental protection may hinder the prospects for economic development because the costs of clean technologies may be prohibitive, particularly in developing societies (Costi 2003).

The authors in Part I differ in their assessment of whether and under what conditions the tensions between development, environmental protection, and human rights are resolvable. In Chapter 1, Michelle Scobie describes the environmental-justice perspective, which began in the 1970s in underrepresented minority communities in the United States in response to industrial zoning rules that exposed these groups to disproportionate levels of environmental pollutants. Globally, the environmental-justice perspective is now embodied in the response of the states of the Global South to the devastating effects of climate change. This perspective emphasizes that people of present and future generations are the rights holders and that the in-
dustrialized states and corporations, as duty bearers, are responsible for mitigating the effects of climate change. Her assessment is cautiously optimistic about the ability of developing states to navigate these tensions successfully and promote all of these values simultaneously.

In Chapter 2, Beatrice Lindstrom highlights the competing demands of environmental justice, human rights, and development in Haiti. As citizens of the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haitians have become accustomed to nongovernmental actors serving as primary service providers. Yet when these nongovernmental actors are necessary partners in the process of development, how can states hold these organizations accountable when their practices sacrifice human rights? Lindstrom shows that coordination between grassroots nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and a global litigation strategy has the potential to simultaneously maximize human rights.

In Chapter 3, Robert Mandel offers a very sobering take against the we-can-have-our-cake-and-eat-it-too approaches to balancing human rights, environmental protection, and development. He argues that when choices must be made between human rights and environmental protection in developed states, human rights often win for two reasons. The global spread of democracy prioritizes liberal, cosmopolitan values that privilege people and their right to consumption over the protection of the physical environment. Additionally, it takes time to recognize the effects of environmental degradation, far longer than it takes to witness human rights violations, allowing rights to take priority in national debates. Among developing countries in the Global South, he argues, the demands of survival and the quest for rapid economic growth swamp pressures to improve human rights or protect the environment. He cautions against the conclusion that we can harmoniously maximize human rights, environmental protection, and development simultaneously.

Violence

A second theme this book addresses is the human rights consequences of brute force and violence. By brute force, we mean physical coercion applied by either the state or organized nonstate actors on a civilian population. On a continuum of possible tools available for compelling an actor to change its course of action, brute force falls along the most severe end, involving the use of boots on the ground, the deployment of naval and air forces, and use of all means of hard power (Mandel 2015). In recent history (between 1989 and 2014) this form of organized violence against civilians has not accounted for the greatest number of fatalities; rather, state-on-state violence is responsible for the greatest share of fatalities during this period. But this form of
one-sided violence, in which the state or an organized nonstate actor uses deadly force against a civilian population, accounted for 39 percent, or 706,106 deaths, between 1989 and 2014.\(^2\) A steep spike in fatalities associated with one-sided violence occurred in 2014 and is largely attributable to the Syrian Civil War. Between 1989 and 2014 Africa was the deadliest region of the world for one-sided violence, followed by South and Central Asia and the Middle East (Melander 2015).

When armed actors use the tools of war against civilian populations, the most basic human rights of those civilian populations are imperiled. In seeking to root out threats to regime stability, a government may send troops to question, detain, and imprison civilians without due process. In Burma, government soldiers routinely engage in large sweeps of the minority Muslim Rohingya community, arresting, extorting, and detaining them en masse (Human Rights Watch 2012). Beyond the obvious deprivation of liberty that such detention entails, when large contingents of troops or armed groups intermix with civilian populations, the human rights of especially vulnerable populations may be at even greater risk. In weak states and among rebel groups, rape of women and girls is often used as a means to foster unit cohesion (Cohen 2013). Both governments and nonstate armed actors may also forcibly recruit child soldiers, depriving these children of their most basic rights (Pilisuk and Rountree 2015). Using their asymmetric power, armed actors may confiscate property and valuables or deprive civilians of means for supporting themselves and their families.

Beyond sending in troops, a government or a nonstate armed actor may direct the tools of war against civilian populations, resulting in devastating loss of life. Muammar Gaddafi, former head of the Libyan government, employed cluster munitions, rocket launchers, and mortars against civilian populations in Misrata during the Libyan Civil War (UN News 2011). Prior to the siege on Misrata, Gaddafi’s forces had engaged in long-term detention and executions of perceived threats to his regime throughout the country (UN Human Rights Council 2012). Bashar Al Assad, president of Syria, employed chemical weapons against men, women, and children in at least 161 documented attacks through December 2015. These attacks have killed nearly 1,500 people and injured another 14,581 through exposure (Syrian American Medical Society 2016).

The contributors to Part II suggest that when the state or nonstate armed groups turn the weapons of war on civilian populations, forcing people to flee their homes and countries, these populations may experience new and distinct types of human rights violations. In Chapter 4, Kerstin Fisk examines the human security of refugees and asylum seekers in sub-Saharan Africa, illustrating that the traditional conception of refugees as threats to state security overlooks the refugees’ own right to human security. Her case stud-
ies of Burundian refugees in Tanzania and Rwanda and refugees from Ethiopia and Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in South Africa illustrate that even when refugees escape, they do not find safety in asylum countries. Burundian refugees in Tanzania and Rwanda were subject to attacks by forces loyal to the Burundian government even after they crossed into these neighboring countries. The South African government allowed the systematic targeting of refugees in violent attacks by xenophobic forces. Whether the perpetrators of violence are refugee senders or refugee hosts, Fisk shows that the human security of refugee populations is in jeopardy even when they are able to flee from violence at home.

In Chapter 5, Neil A. Englehart illustrates the ways in which cease-fires can exacerbate certain types of human rights abuses. Militants who are fighting government forces need civilian support and access to financing. These needs dictate the types of abuses these groups engage in—kidnapping and killing government officials both serve these ends. But once a cease-fire has been negotiated, the needs of these former militants change, and as Englehart shows, their patterns of human rights abuses do as well. When militants disarm as part of the terms of a cease-fire, they may stop engaging in the abuses that allowed them to fight the government, but they do not stop violating human rights. Englehart’s analysis shows that cease-fire groups across Asia simply begin behaving like government-supported groups in their patterns of human rights abuses. His analysis demonstrates that cease-fires do not necessarily mean peace and safety for civilians. Instead, cease-fire groups adapt, behaving like government-supported groups, and subject civilians to the same sorts of human rights violations as government-supported groups.

Once intrastate violence has ceased, governments have many ways of moving forward: truth and reconciliation commissions can be used to uncover truth without prosecution, traditional prosecutions can be employed, or governments may simply opt to grant blanket amnesty and move forward. In Chapter 6, Brian Frederking and Max Aviles show that in countries undergoing democratic transitions, the use of truth-and-justice mechanisms (tribunals) has a marginal yet positive impact on human rights. Moreover, when these tribunals mete out punishment for state-sponsored violence rather than simply allow truth revelation in exchange for amnesty, human rights improve.

Collectively, the chapters in Part II suggest that there are reasons to fear new and distinct types of human rights violations once civilian populations successfully flee violence. Xenophobia, abuse at the hands of asylum governments, torture, restrictions on freedom of movement, and abuses of civil rights are all possible following the end of violence. Once state violence has ceased, cease-fires and transitional justice mechanisms may exacerbate and intensify new forms of violence against civilians.
Citizenship

Once those civilians manage to successfully escape dangerous or unhealthy conditions at home, what sorts of rights and opportunities can they expect to receive in countries of refuge? A critical element in understanding what rights and opportunities await migrants in countries of refuge is citizenship. If migrants have no realistic hope of naturalizing, they may remain detained in a refugee camp with minimal resources until they are able to return home. It is not uncommon for people to reside in this state of limbo for many years, unwelcome in their country of residence but unable to return home. For the Sahrawis, a group of 150,000 refugees living in camps in western Algeria since the late 1970s, the camps have become a way of life (Epatko 2013). In this regard, citizenship in international relations is paradoxical. While the international human rights regime is universal, ostensibly applying to all people as a consequence of their humanity, in reality, for migrants who flee their home to find refuge in another country, the rights and opportunities they can expect to receive vary considerably and are dependent, inter alia, on citizenship laws (see Chapter 9 for a discussion).

According to the UNHCR, 34,000 people were displaced from their homes each day in 2015 because of conflict or persecution. There are now 65.3 million forcibly displaced people in the world; of those 21.3 million are children (UNHCR 2015). Only 16.1 million people have obtained official refugee status through the UNHCR, and there are an additional 5.2 million Palestinian refugees, who are registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency (n.d.). These numbers matter for two reasons. First, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria and instability in Somalia have generated the highest number of forcibly displaced people on record. In short, these numbers are unprecedented. Second, the numbers represent individual lives, hopes, and dreams for the future. One cannot think about emerging threats to human rights without examining the greatest single threat to the enjoyment of human rights. Today, the realization of human rights is inextricably bound with questions of citizenship and nationality.

But Part III demonstrates that citizenship laws serve a dual purpose. Not only do rules governing the extension of citizenship carry with them important human rights consequences for migrants who successfully flee violence or environmental degradation, but the discriminatory deprivation of nationality may also serve as the initial impetus behind migration (van Waas 2008). Discriminatory deprivation of nationality is an especially cruel way for a government to use citizenship laws to discriminate against unpopular groups. When citizenship status or even permanent residency status is revoked on the basis of race, ethnicity, or any other immutable characteristic, the core rights that flow from citizenship or resi-
dency status are also revoked. People lose the ability to work, travel freely, go to school, and secure housing. Stateless people are often detained and held without cause as authorities attempt to sort out their status. Unlike refugees, who flee their country of nationality in search of safety but still retain their citizenship, those who have had their citizenship revoked (or those born without citizenship) have grim prospects in regard to their human rights.

And while the UNHCR reports that there are approximately 10 million stateless people in the world today, the real number is likely closer to 15 million (see Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion 2014). The overwhelming majority, some 97.6 percent, of the stateless people identified by the UNHCR reside in just twenty countries (van Waas, de Chickera, and Albarazi 2014). This concentration better reflects gaps in reporting than actual geographic distributions of stateless populations. For example, the UNHCR’s official numbers include reports from just four of forty-seven of countries in sub-Saharan Africa and neglect 2.1 million Palestinians who have never been displaced from the West Bank or Gaza Strip but whose status is undoubtedly in question (van Waas, de Chickera, and Albarazi 2014).

In Chapter 7, I grapple with the human rights consequences of statelessness, examining the experience of Rohingya Muslims in the Greater Mekong Subregion. In 1982 the Burmese government started the process of eliminating citizenship status for the Rohingya, who had lived in Burma for more than two centuries. In the decades that followed, Rohingya human rights deteriorated precipitously, including the right to travel outside their village, freely marry, or work. As their rights evaporated and they became stateless, many Rohingya were left with little choice but to flee Burma, culminating in the 2015 Rohingya refugee crisis. I argue that a tragic and previously unappreciated human rights consequence of statelessness is an acute susceptibility to traffickers. I examine the links between Rohingya rights violations and the likelihood of trafficking, arguing that statelessness renders groups susceptible to traffickers.

Whereas stateless populations fare poorly in the Greater Mekong Subregion, as evidenced by the tragic experiences of the Rohingya, these populations do not necessarily fare better after arrival in the European Union (EU). In Chapter 8, Patricia Rodda and Charles Anthony Smith show that across Europe, states’ immigration agendas conflict with a surprisingly underdeveloped European stateless regime. Rodda and Smith argue that unlike the EU’s well-developed asylum and antitrafficking regimes, there has been no effort at the supranational level to harmonize statelessness determination procedures. The result is a patchwork approach to statelessness across Europe that has grave consequences for the human rights of stateless populations. As refugees and stateless people flood into Europe, these uneven
procedures leave many in legal limbo, unable to work and susceptible to traffickers.

In Chapter 9, Jeannette Money and Shaina Western consider the characteristics of migrant-receiving countries that enhance or diminish the quality of refuge migrants arriving in new countries can expect to receive. They show that in spite of an international legal framework that emphasizes universal human rights, in reality refugees face a hierarchy of rights depending on the characteristics of the refuge country. Some governments provide high levels of resettlement support that allow migrants to integrate, develop job skills, and thrive; others allow migrants to eke out a living in a refugee camp; and still other governments simply detain and deport. Money and Western argue that when countries of refuge have a high level of human development, have a strong quality of governance, and provide access to citizenship, survival migrants are better equipped to thrive in their new countries. The authors’ analysis suggests that migrants tend to settle in countries within the same region, meaning that today most flee and then resettle in the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa. Countries with the fewest resources tend to be those that provide refuge most frequently, calling into question human rights that migrants can expect to receive, even after they have fled.

Human Rights: Looking across and between the Issues

Traditionally in international relations, resource deprivation, violence, and citizenship are not treated or examined together. Scholars interested in the politics of conservation and pollution may examine challenges that impede the negotiation of successful agreements or point to factors that hasten the collapse of such agreements (Battaglini and Harstad 2016; Susskind and Ali 2014; Gupta 2012). Similarly, scholars of state violence, in seeking to explain why a government might choose to take up arms against its civilian population or why civilians might choose to rebel against the government, identify the conditions under which such violence is most likely to occur (Collier 2006). In the statelessness and citizenship literature, those studying this phenomenon often adopt a legal framework, trying to understand how and why municipal or international law could permit such an outcome (van Waas 2008; Milbrandt 2011). Respectively, resource deprivation, violence, and citizenship are often examined within a conservation, security, and legal framework. Yet these traditional frameworks neglect the important human rights consequences associated with environmental scarcity/degradation, state violence, and deprivation of citizenship. By grouping these topics, not only can we more easily see the intersections between them, but we also can emphasize the human rights framework as a way to highlight these intersections.
The 2005 Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan provides a good example of the value of grouping these topics together and the traction that can be gained by employing the human rights framework. Since independence in 1991, the government in Uzbekistan has remained a repressive, autocratic regime led in 2005 by Islam Karimov. Uzbek authorities became enraged in the early 2000s when a group of Muslim businessmen began distributing food and necessities to the struggling population of Uzbekistan. The government feared that because of this distribution of basic necessities, the people would shift their loyalty away from the government in favor of this group. In 2005 Karimov’s government arrested the businessmen, leading to widespread protest in Andijan for their release in May 2005. The government responded by firing into the crowd of protesters, killing between 187 (government estimate) and 1,500 (Human Rights Watch estimate) (Human Rights Watch 2005). To defend its attack on the protesters to the rest of the world, Uzbek authorities claimed that the protesters were Islamic Fundamentalist terrorists, members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir.

A more basic narrative for this story would suggest that a bad, autocratic government deprived its population of food and then used violence against the people for rising up in response to the policy. When we delve deeper into this example, we can see the value of grouping these topics together. The businessmen were motivated to distribute basic necessities to the poor as a consequence of their religious beliefs. As the government stopped providing basic necessities, the wealthy businessmen were compelled to step in and help the population. The failure to provide basic necessities, in this case the provision of food, if left unaddressed, would lead to malnutrition, disease, and possibly death. Such maladies inhibit the enjoyment of even the most basic aspiration for a full life. And one of the outcomes of this resource scarcity was state violence; the government responded to the uprising in support of the businessmen by firing into the crowd, depriving hundreds of people, perhaps even more than a thousand, of their lives. And why were people willing to challenge the government? Without food, their prospects for life were most certainly diminished. From a human rights perspective, the protesters were met with two unenviable options: risk being deprived of food or risk stepping into the government’s crosshairs by challenging it to release the businessmen. Finally, the government attempted to use the narrative of us versus them, citizen versus terrorist, to justify its actions to a critical global community. Here the role of citizenship is critical: it was used by the government to justify killing Uzbeks.

The value added in grouping these topics together is that we can make the human rights consequences of these emerging threats the central focus of our analysis. Additionally, when we emphasize rights rather than security, law, or conservation, we can examine the important ways in which these
emerging threats to rights are connected. The primary argument this book advances is that in dismissing the traditional frameworks often applied to the environment, violence, and citizenship in favor of considering the human rights impact yields important insights into the ways in which these issues are interconnected in the real world.

Environment-Violence Connections

One branch of literature on environment-violence connection suggests that resource scarcity and environmental degradation can be a direct cause of state violence (Homer-Dixon 1994). When populations are deprived of basic necessities such as clean drinking water or food, they may take to the streets to protest and demand better provisions from their governments, as the Andijan Massacre aptly illustrates. Violence among groups may similarly erupt when water or arable farmland becomes scarce and groups must compete to obtain these resources. A different approach highlights the ways in which resource scarcity can be an intervening or indirect cause of violence, suggesting, for instance, that environmental scarcity can activate latent ethnic tensions, causing intraethnic violence to flare up (Baechler 1999). Still others suggest that resource scarcity and degradation are not necessarily a cause of violence, but populations may, through technological innovations, social institutions, or market mechanisms, avoid outright conflict in the face of environmental challenges. Though anecdotal evidence of the environment-violence connection abounds, a robust statistical relationship between these factors has yet to be identified in the literature (Bernauer, Bohmelt, and Koubi 2012).

The discussion in Part I reinforces many of the central findings in this literature but highlights the ways in which competition over resources is rarely confined to conflicts between local groups. The violence, conflict, and contestation over resources can ensnare states located thousands of miles apart and require the assistance and support of intergovernmental organization and NGOs, while pitting more-developed and less-developed countries against each other. The authors in Part I suggest that we expand our understanding of actors and forms of violence that emerge from conflicts over resources.

In Chapter 2, on the cholera epidemic in Haiti, Lindstrom shows that conflict over the source of water contamination can emerge between an intergovernmental actor (the UN) and the local population sickened by contaminated water. Here, the conflict over resources is not simply between domestic groups fighting for access to a dwindling resource. Instead, the conflict emerged because the UN needed to maintain a presence in Haiti to maintain order in the wake of violence. In Chapter 1, Scobie draws on the
environmental-justice perspective to identify nontraditional actors involved in resource conflicts. She points to those who are socially more vulnerable and therefore least able to adapt to the consequences of climate change, as well as future generations, to understand locations of emerging sites of conflict over resources. These chapters suggest that the traditional way we have thought about a unidirectional environmental-violence link, invoking conflicting domestic actors over scarce resources, can miss the point. These conflicts can emerge between actors in far-flung places yet still call into question the enjoyment of basic human rights.

**Violence-Citizenship Connections**

Research on the connections between violence and flight are well developed in the scholarly literature, clearly establishing a relationship between violence, human rights abuses, and forced migration (Moore and Shellman 2004; Apodaca 1998; Schmeidl 1997). Yet across this literature there is a simple underlying assumption: once migrants flee from human rights abuses and violence in their country of origin, their prospects for a life with dignity ought to improve.

But again, the traditional framework misses important opportunities to tease out connections between violence, flight, migration, and prospects for human rights. In Chapter 4, Fisk forces the reader to think not about the security of the migrant-receiving states but rather about the human security of refugees and migrants who experience violent attacks even after they have fled. As refugees and migrants flood into host countries, their status as non-citizens creates a second set of threats: xenophobic violence. In Chapter 5, Englehart addresses the prospects for peace and human rights following the cessation of violence, challenging received wisdom that rights improve after cessation of hostilities. The implication is that, perhaps counterintuitively, fleeing one’s country of origin even after the cessation of hostilities may improve one’s rights prospects. Moreover, the causal relationship between citizenship and violence can go in the opposite direction. In Chapter 7, I show that when the government rescinded the citizenship of the Rohingya community in Burma, violence erupted between the Buddhist majority and the Rohingya. The intraethnic violence has today risen to what many observers consider a genocide against the Rohingya.

My argument is that dismissing the traditional frameworks (see Figure I.1) gives us traction in thinking about how human rights are imperiled across the issue areas; environmental degradation can be both a cause and consequence of violence. Deprivation of natural resources can spark violence both between groups and between people and their government. And simply fleeing violence at home does not necessarily improve prospects for rights
abroad. As Money and Western suggest in Chapter 9, “Where those who seek refuge end up matters.” This book addresses the issue of human rights at the intersections between the environment and violence, as well as between violence and citizenship.

This book addresses emerging threats to human rights that are vast and seemingly intractable. As the peril of our planet increases, populations are confronting difficult trade-offs: remaining in dirty, polluted environments and risking disease and death or fleeing in search of a better life. As civilians face unspeakable violence at the hands of both states and nonstate armed actors, they confront painful decisions about remaining at home or migrating. This book shows that once a difficult decision to migrate is made, naturalization and citizenship laws can obstruct the fulfillment of human rights in host countries. Emerging threats to human rights are displacing people at rates previously unexperienced, but by looking at some of the intersections between these areas, we can begin to think more systematically about the links between human rights and migration.

NOTES

1. The following is not a comprehensive list of the drivers of human migration.
2. As Erik Melander (2015) explains, this number is inflated because of the inclusion of the Rwandan genocide, which claimed approximately five hundred thousand lives.

REFERENCES


