

Introduction

Resources, Engagement, and Recruitment

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How do we govern ourselves? Why do some people have more say over what the government does than others? While these might seem like complex questions, in many ways it is a simple process. A representative democracy can be divided into three parts: the people, elected officials and government institutions, and policy outcomes (Figure 1.1). The arrows in Figure 1.1 symbolize how these three parts are interconnected. Starting from the left, the first arrow symbolizes the ability of citizens in a free society to articulate their preferences to the government. The second arrow symbolizes the influence that elected officials and governmental institutions have on policy outcomes. The arrows at the bottom of the figure symbolize how policy outcomes affect the people. Taken together, Figure 1.1 illustrates that representative democracy is an iterative process whereby the people express their preferences, elected officials act to create policy, these policies affect the people, and in turn the people react by expressing their preferences, and so on.

Figure 1.1 leads to two important observations about how a representative democracy works. The first is that policy outcomes are a product of citizen action; people who express their views, and those who express them more loudly and clearly, are more likely to get what they want. The second is that politicians and government institutions structure policy outcomes; the preferences of elected officials, and the rules that they work under, influence policy independent of the public's preferences.




Figure 1.1 A simple model of how a representative democracy functions.

While both are important to our understanding of democracy, this book focuses on the first of these two observations. More specifically, each chapter is a reexamination of the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) that was developed by Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady (VSB) in their seminal book *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (Harvard University Press, 1995). Based on survey data they collected from over 15,000 Americans during 1989–1990 (the Citizen Participation Study, or CPS), *Voice and Equality* fundamentally advanced our understanding of democracy by showing that individuals who are civically active have three things in common: they have the capacity to do so (i.e., resources), they want to (i.e., engagement), and they have been asked to get involved (i.e., recruitment). The purpose of this chapter is to summarize VSB’s argument and to highlight how our understanding of civic life in the United States has both changed and stayed the same over the past two decades since *Voice and Equality* was published.

What Is “Civic Voluntarism”?

Before discussing the intricacies of the CVM, it is first necessary to define the outcome of interest (i.e., the dependent variable): civic voluntarism (also referred to in this volume as “civic participation”). As defined by VSB, and as depicted in Figure 1.2, civic voluntarism is a large set of activities that involve the individual stepping out of his or her private life and into civil society. Civil society is both literal, as in the public space in which citizens congregate (e.g., the town square), and figurate, as in the liberties that protect the public’s ability to express themselves (e.g., the First Amendment to the United States Constitution).

As represented in Figure 1.2 by the upward-facing arrow connecting private life and the state, civic voluntarism is the method citizens have to express their preferences to the government. The downward-facing arrow connecting the state to private life indicates that civic voluntarism also facilitates governance because an active citizenry demands better government and, as




Figure 1.2 What is civic voluntarism? *Source:* Adapted from Figure 2.1 in Klofstad (2011).

such, is more likely to receive it (Mayhew 1974; Putnam 2000). Civic activism also facilitates governance by augmenting the actions of the government. For example, volunteering for the Red Cross can help the government respond to a natural disaster, participating in a neighborhood watch program can help law enforcement keep the peace, and the like.

As shown on the right-hand side of Figure 1.2, VSB classified civic acts as either political or nonpolitical in nature. Political civic voluntarism “has the intent or effect of influencing government action—either directly by affecting the making or implementation of policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (VSB 1995, p. 38). These activities include voting, making donations to candidates or political organizations, contacting elected officials, and volunteering for electoral campaigns. Nonpolitical civic voluntarism involves activities whereby the individual enters public life and interacts with his or her fellow citizens, but not with the purposive intent of influencing the government. These activities include volunteering, philanthropy, membership in civic organizations, participation in school and the workplace, and religious activities.

While the difference between political and nonpolitical civic voluntarism is based on the intent of the actor, VSB showed that the boundary between the two is not always clear. As they stated it, “. . . one of the main themes of this book is the embeddedness of political activity in the non-political institutions of civil society” (VSB 1995, p. 40). That is, participating in nonpolitical civic activities increases the odds that we will obtain the means, motive, and opportunity to become politically active. This finding is addressed in greater detail below when the CVM is discussed.

In addition to being categorized as political or nonpolitical, VSB also classified civic acts on three additional dimensions: the requirements to act, the clarity of the message that is conveyed, and the amount of the activity that can be engaged in (i.e., multiplicity). For example, in terms of

requirements, while money is necessary to make a political donation, time is required to write an email to an elected official. In terms of clarity, while a vote is a basic endorsement of one candidate over another, a donation to an interest group is a clearer indication of one's preferences on a particular policy. In terms of multiplicity, while each citizen is only allowed one vote, a person can donate as much money as wanted to political candidates (within the bounds of campaign finance laws), the implication being that activities that can be engaged in with greater volume have the potential for greater impact. Taken together, the benefit of these three additional classifications is that they allow us to know what is required for the individual to engage in the given activity and how clear and loud one's civic voice will be.

Preexisting Approaches to the Study of Civic Voluntarism: The SES and Rational Choice Models

Given the central importance of civic voluntarism to self-governance the topic has been studied at great length. One preexisting paradigm in this line of research that VSB responded to in *Voice and Equality* is the Socioeconomic Status (SES) Model. Simply stated, the SES Model predicts that individuals with higher social status (i.e., those with higher incomes, education, and occupational prestige) will be more likely to participate in civil society.

The strength of the SES Model is that it is well grounded empirically. For example, countless studies show that factors such as income and education are correlated strongly with voter turnout, making campaign donations, participating in civic organizations, and the like (e.g., Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; Milbrath and Goel 1977; VSB 1995). However, while the SES Model clearly identifies what demographic variables correlate with civic activity, VSB argued that it has a weak theoretical foundation regarding the mechanisms linking SES and civic activity. Or, as they stated it, “. . . the SES model is weak in its theoretical underpinnings. It fails to provide a coherent rationale for the connection between the explanatory socioeconomic variables and participation” (VSB 1995, p. 281).

The second research paradigm VSB responded to in *Voice and Equality* is the Rational Choice Model. This model is based on the concepts of costs and benefits. In short, if the benefits to the individual outweigh the costs associated with becoming civically active he or she will participate to obtain those benefits (i.e., civic voluntarism will occur out of self-interest). Consequently, rational choice scholars argue that it is irrational to be civically active because it is unlikely that the efforts of any one citizen will affect the government or society in a meaningful way. For example, even in small electorates it is unlikely that a single vote will determine the outcome. Since determining the outcome would be the tangible benefit associated

with voting, the Rational Choice Model leads to the conclusion that it is irrational to take the time, energy, and money (for those who work for an hourly wage) to vote.

The strength of the rational choice approach is its theoretical foundation. Based on the concepts of costs and benefits, the Rational Choice Model provides a parsimonious explanation of the conditions under which citizens will become civically active. In contrast, however, in *Voice and Equality* VSB argued that rational choice scholarship on civic voluntarism does not have a strong empirical foundation for a variety of reasons. First, while the Rational Choice Model predicts that citizens will not participate because it is irrational to do so, many of us still do. Second, VSB showed that contrary to the prediction of rational choice scholars, individuals often choose to become civically active in the interest of the collective (e.g., influencing policy that affects all citizens), not just out of self-interest (e.g., obtaining assistance from the government on a personal problem). Finally, VSB discussed the idea that some rational choice research predicts that the more well educated among us should be the least likely to get involved in civic life, under the assumption that education increases one's ability to understand that it is an irrational act. In contrast to this prediction, education and civic participation are highly correlated.

The Civic Voluntarism Model: A "Process of Political Activation"

Neither the SES Model nor the Rational Choice Model maximizes both predictive and theoretical power. With this in mind, one of the central contributions of *Voice and Equality* is the CVM, a simple yet powerful explanation of the antecedents of civic participation with strong theoretical and empirical footing. In developing this model, VSB flipped the traditional research question around. That is, instead of asking why people are civically active, they asked why people are not civically active. Once posed this way, the most straightforward answer was "... because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked" (VSB 1995, p. 15). These factors—resources, engagement, and recruitment—form the three pillars of the CVM.

Resources: "They Can't"

While the United States Constitution protects Americans' freedom to participate in civil society, doing so is not free. For example, as the Rational Choice Model makes clear, voting comes with the costs of lost time, energy, and, for some, money. VSB call these prerequisites for participation "resources," defined as time, money, and "civic skills."

While time and money are familiar concepts, civic skills may not be. VBS defined civic skills as “. . . the requisite organizational and communications capacities . . .” (VSB 1995, p. 271) that allow people to use their time and money, and to do so more effectively. That is, civic skills not only predict the likelihood of participation but also the likelihood of the activity being successful. VSB measured civic skills in a number of ways, including educational attainment, vocabulary, communication skills, organizational skills, and leadership experience. VSB showed that these skills are obtained through participation in nonpolitical civic institutions, including the family, school, church, the workplace, and civic organizations. For example, if a person organizes a bake sale to raise money for his or her church, that person can apply those experiences in other contexts, including politics (e.g., organize a protest). Or, if a person regularly writes emails at his or her workplace, these experiences allow him or her to develop communication skills that can be applied in other domains, which, again, include politics (e.g., write an email to an elected official).

Taken together, VSB showed that time, money, and civic skills predict whether a person will become civically active, even if all three are accounted for in the analysis simultaneously (VSB 1995, p. 389). In many ways, this finding that resources correlate with civic activity sounds like a restatement of the SES Model. However, the resource-participation nexus identified by VSB is more nuanced for three interrelated reasons. First, identifying time, money, and civic skills as pathways through which SES promotes civic activity is more precise than simply observing that “social status” correlates with civic voluntarism. Second, not all three of VSB’s resources correlate with socioeconomic status. More specifically, while the distribution of money and civic skills favors higher SES individuals, free time is more evenly distributed across society. Third, the three resources identified by VSB correlate with different civic acts. Importantly, this suggests that different types of people, endowed with different types of resources, will only have the ability to engage in certain types of civic activities (VSB 1995, p. 363). For example, while time-intensive activities such as volunteering for a political campaign are highly correlated with civic skills, and somewhat with free time, income has a weak relationship with these types of activities. In contrast, making a financial contribution to a candidate or political organization is strongly influenced by income, but not by civic skills or free time.

Engagement: “They Don’t Want To”

By basing the CVM on resources, VSB established a hierarchy of needs for would-be civic activists. More specifically, if people do not have the resources to act they are functionally unable to do so. This said, VSB identified a

second factor that is also correlated with civic participation, even if resources are accounted for in the analysis: civic engagement (VSB 1995, pp. 352–353).¹ VSB measured engagement with four variables: interest in politics, knowledge about politics, political efficacy (i.e., the feeling that one’s actions can influence the government), and strength of political preferences (i.e., partisanship). In additional analyses (VSB 1995, Chapter 14), VSB showed that “issue engagement”—having strong feelings on specific political issues—also encourages civic voluntarism.²

Of these measures of engagement, VSB found that political interest is the most strongly correlated with one’s overall level of civic voluntarism (VSB 1995, pp. 352–353). This said, as with resources the different elements of civic engagement correlate with different civic activities (VSB 1995, p. 363). For example, while political interest is highly correlated with time-intensive activities such as volunteering for a political campaign, it is less important in determining whether a person donates money to a political cause.

As with resources, VSB showed that civic engagement is enhanced by participation in nonpolitical civic activities. For example, discussion about the current election with colleagues at work might lead a person to become more interested in the race, organizing a successful meeting at church might increase a person’s confidence in successfully organizing other types of meetings (e.g., a political rally), and the like.

Recruitment: “Nobody Asked”

The tertiary factor in the CVM is recruitment. While recruitment is shown to enhance participation even if resources and engagement are accounted for (VSB 1995, p. 389), VSB relegated this factor to the background of the CVM because, as they state it, “participation can, and does, take place in the absence of specific requests for activity” (VSB 1995, p. 270). That is, our personal supply of resources and engagement can be enough to motivate civic activism, even if no one asks us to participate. VSB also suggested that recruitment has a weaker influence on civic participation because it is highly correlated with resources and engagement. More specifically, given that those who mobilize their fellow citizens want a high return on their recruitment efforts, they focus their efforts on the individuals who are already likely to be civically active (also see Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999).

1. While “civic participation” and “civic engagement” are often used as equivalent terms they are not. Civic engagement is a psychological state that encourages civic participation.

2. For a more detailed discussion of issue-based motivations see Chapter 9 by Jenkins and Andolina.

As with resources and engagement, VSB showed that instances of recruitment are most likely to occur when participating in nonpolitical civic activities. For example, religious leaders might encourage their members to vote, or casual chats about politics with friends, family, and coworkers can lead to instances of recruitment (e.g., Klofstad 2011).

Participatory Distortion

Given the primacy of resources in the CVM, a troubling conclusion drawn from *Voice and Equality* is that the subset of Americans with the means to participate in civil society is “. . . limited and unrepresentative . . .” (VSB 1995, p. 2) of the wider public. More specifically, that subset of society is systematically biased in favor of the more well to do and educated among us. This bias distorts the messages that are transmitted to the government because individuals with different income and education levels have different needs. Or, as VSB put it, “The voices that speak loudly articulate a different set of messages about the state of the public, its needs, and its preferences from those that would be sent by those who are inactive” (VSB 1995, p. 11).

VSB also illustrated that this bias in civic voice is self-reinforcing, both across generations (i.e., the “Inter-Generational Developmental Model”) and over an individual’s lifetime. As one’s income and education have a strong basis in the socioeconomic status of one’s parents (e.g., Black and Devereux 2011), VSB concluded that individuals who come from more prosperous backgrounds are conferred a louder civic voice compared to those of us from less privileged backgrounds. Likewise, for the more privileged among us, as we acquire higher levels of education and income the factors that drive people to engage in civic voluntarism “are stockpiled over the course of a lifetime” (VSB 1995, p. 4).

Civic Voluntarism in the Twenty-First Century

Voice and Equality showed that many of us sit out of civil society largely because we lack the resources that are required to participate and, to a lesser extent, because we lack the desire and because no one mobilized us. Importantly, this shows that civic voluntarism is not a simple matter of taste, whereby political “junkies” are more likely to be civically active than the rest of us. Instead, VSB showed that the pool of participants in American civil society is systematically biased in favor of those with greater resources.

While these findings greatly enhanced our understanding of self-governance and how it can fail society as a whole, a great deal of social and political change has occurred since *Voice and Equality* was published in 1995 (Table 1.1). For example, Internet usage in the United States has

TABLE 1.1 WHAT HAS CHANGED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE *VOICE AND EQUALITY* WAS PUBLISHED?

	1995	2015
Percent of U.S. adults who use the Internet (1996 vs. 2014)*	14%	87%
Percent of U.S. population foreign born**	8%	13%
Turnout of U.S. voting eligible population (1996 vs. 2012)^	52%	58%
Share of total wealth in U.S. held by top .1%^^	appx. 13%	appx. 23%
Percent of Americans who do not have a religious preference (1995 vs. 2015)†	7%	17%

Sources: *Pew Internet Research Center (www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/internet-use/internet-use-over-time); **U.S. Census Bureau (www.census.gov/population/foreign/data/cps.html); ^United States Election Project (www.electproject.org/national-1789-present); ^^Saez & Zucman (2014); †Gallup (www.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx).

increased by 73 percentage points, the number of Americans who are foreign born has increased by 5 percentage points, voter turnout in presidential elections has increased by 6 percentage points, the share of total wealth in the United States owned by the top 0.1 percent has increased by approximately 10 percentage points, and the percentage of Americans who claim that they do not identify with a religion has more than doubled.

These and other changes that have occurred in the transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century lead to the question of what we have learned about civil society in the United States since *Voice and Equality* was published. The remainder of this chapter answers this question by summarizing the arguments made in the chapters of this volume.

Part I: Race and Religion

Part I of this volume considers changes in the racial/ethnic makeup and religiosity of American society. In Chapter 2, Lisa García Bedolla and Dinorah Sánchez Loza review the development of scholarship on Latino civic activism. Since the publication of *Voice and Equality* the literature on Latino politics has exploded, fueled by the growing size of the Latino community in the United States as well as an increase in the availability of reliable survey data.

García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza focus on three factors that drive Latino civic participation: sociopolitical context, recruitment, and “immigrant-specific factors.” With regard to sociopolitical context, while Latinos are less civically active than whites, García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza find that significant political events can stimulate Latino civic activism. A prime example is the 2006

protests in California precipitated by legislation designed to deny social services to undocumented immigrants and their children.³ This finding suggests that while the CVM's primary focus on individual-level factors—resources and civic engagement—is both powerful and parsimonious, the social and political processes that are operating around us also matter a great deal to whether we participate in civil society.

With regard to recruitment, García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza argue that while Latinos are typically not recruited to vote because they are less likely to do so, recent studies show that Latinos can be mobilized to vote if the message is targeted and crafted in the right way. More specifically, García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza suggest that recruitment might play a larger role in stimulating civic activism than its tertiary status in the CVM.⁴

Finally, with regard to immigrant-specific factors, García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza discuss the various factors that affect immigrant incorporation into the social and political institutions of American life. In short, it takes years for an immigrant to become integrated into American civil society, and this process is easier for each successive immigrant generation. VSB were unable to address this topic in *Voice and Equality* because their data did not include a sufficient number of Latino respondents to examine differences across immigrant generations.

In Chapter 3, Karthick Ramakrishnan and Sono Shah expand upon García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza's chapter through a comparison of civic activism by whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans (this final group was unable to be studied by VSB due to an insufficient number of Asian American respondents). In line with García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza's discussion of the literature on immigrant incorporation, Ramakrishnan and Shah examine how civic activism changes across immigrant generations, with particular attention to Latinos and Asian Americans. They find that over successive immigrant generations Latinos and Asian Americans become more active in nonpolitical civic activities. VSB showed that participation in these types of activities provides people with the means and wherewithal to also become active in politics. Contrary to this, Ramakrishnan and Shah do not see commensurate increases in voter turnout over successive generations of Latinos and Asian Americans, though there is for other political activities such as discussing politics and contacting elected officials.

In Chapter 4 David Campbell switches focus to the role of religion in civil society. In *Voice and Equality*, VSB showed that participation in religious

3. For examples of this type of phenomenon in the African American community see Chapter 6 by Burch.

4. On this point also see Chapter 10 by Anoll and Michelson.

activities allows people to develop civic skills. Importantly, as religious institutions are open to people with varied levels of resources, VSB contended that the development of civic skills in the congregation offsets some of the SES-based biases in who participates in civil society. They also showed that the correlation between religiosity and civic skills is stronger for Protestants, a religion with a flat hierarchy that makes use of lay volunteers from the congregation, and weaker for Catholics, a more hierarchical religion that makes less use of lay volunteers. For VSB the lack of skill-building experiences in the typical Catholic parish is a reason for lower levels of civic participation among Latinos.

Here, Campbell digs deeper into the role of religion in civil society by examining the acquisition of civic skills across nine different religions traditions. He finds, as VSB did, that Catholics are less likely to build civic skills compared to Protestants, and individuals who acquire civic skills in the congregation are more likely to be politically active. However, Campbell expands our understanding of civic skill-building in the church beyond what VSB found in *Voice and Equality* by identifying the types of religious institutions that foster civic skill development. In short, smaller congregations that engage in community service provide the most civic skills, while faiths focused on the personal piety of their members rather than the needs of the community are less efficient at developing civic skills.

Campbell concludes his chapter with a reminder of the data in Table 1.1. While VSB were positive about the role of religion in American civil society, Campbell notes that religiosity is declining, particularly among young people, Latinos, and political progressives. As such, the ability of religion to ameliorate the biases in who participates in civil society may also be waning. Moreover, given that religious affiliation is in rapid decline in the Latino community (Pew Research Center 2014), Campbell's findings suggest that religion is not likely to solve the participatory inequities documented in Chapter 2 by García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza and in Chapter 3 by Ramakrishnan and Shah.

Part II: Political Institutions and Public Policy

Part II of this volume examines how governmental institutions and policies affect civic participation. As discussed in Chapter 2 by García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza, sociopolitical context shapes whether and how a person participates in civil society. Government is a central part of that context.

In Chapter 5 Barry Burden and Logan Vidal examine the critical role that electoral institutions play in influencing voter turnout. As electoral law in the United States is largely in the hands of state governments, there is a great deal of variation in these institutions that affects citizens' ability and

desire to vote in myriad ways. Burden and Vidal examine this variation to see how different electoral laws affect resources, engagement, and recruitment.

A prime example is voter registration. With regard to resources, VSB found this element of the CVM to be weakly correlated with voter turnout. Burden and Vidal disagree, noting that registration is a barrier to turnout and that individuals with greater resources are better equipped to overcome this institutional impediment (e.g., education is correlated with knowledge about how the registration process works). That is, voter registration laws can lead to resource-driven inequality at the polls. By way of example, Burden and Vidal show that less restrictive laws that allow voters to register and vote simultaneously make the process less costly by combining the two steps into one and, in doing so, help ameliorate SES-based bias in voter turnout.

With regard to engagement, Burden and Vidal admit that it might seem difficult to envision how electoral laws affect a person's interest in politics. They also note, however, that the electorate's interest in politics, and the degree to which candidates, political organizations, and the mass media stimulate that interest, increases as Election Day approaches. Consequently, Burden and Vidal conclude that registration laws allowing registration closer to or on Election Day tap into the increased engagement of citizens who are not normally interested in politics. Consequently, such laws might help ameliorate engagement-based inequality at the polls.

With regard to recruitment, as discussed in *Voice and Equality* political organizations focus their mobilization efforts on likely voters. Burden and Vidal note that the primary way these organizations identify their targets is through each state's list of registered voters. Consequently, laws that facilitate registration also facilitate recruitment. By way of example, Burden and Vidal analyze the effect of "motor voter" laws (e.g., allowing registration while renewing a driver's license) on recruitment. Their analysis shows that residents of states with motor voter laws were more likely to be recruited to vote by political parties, even after accounting for resources (e.g., income and education) and engagement (e.g., past voting history and strength of partisanship).

In line with Burden and Vidal's examination of electoral institutions, in Chapter 6 Traci Burch examines the effect that the United States criminal justice system has on political participation. Burch first focuses her analysis on how these institutions affect citizens' resources and civic engagement. With regard to resources, Burch shows that being convicted of a crime has negative effects on income (e.g., employers often discriminate against job candidates with criminal records) and access to education (e.g., drug offenders are ineligible for federal grants to support higher education). With regard to engagement, Burch shows that contact with the criminal justice system has negative effects on efficacy and trust in government, although as

discussed in Chapter 2 by García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza, perceptions of injustices in the criminal justice system can also lead to political expression through protest (e.g., recent protests in various cities across the United States over police brutality). Racial and ethnic minorities, and African Americans in particular, experience these largely negative effects on resources and civic engagement disproportionately.

While the first half of Burch's analysis makes use of the CVM to explain how the criminal justice system impacts civic participation, the second half of the chapter argues that the model does not account for the actions of governmental institutions. More specifically, the United States criminal justice system imposes legal barriers to participation in civil society, a factor that Burch argues is exogenous to (i.e., outside of) the CVM. The starkest example discussed by Burch is felony disenfranchisement. While state policies vary, all but two (Maine and Vermont) have some form of restriction on voting rights for individuals who are currently under or have been released from incarceration. Moreover, recent estimates cited by Burch show that approximately 2.5 percent of the American voting-age population has been disenfranchised by the government due to their criminal record. Of these, nearly half were convicted of a crime in one of the eleven states that reserves the right to disenfranchise them for life. As with the largely negative impact of the criminal justice system on resources and engagement, African Americans face these barriers to civic participation disproportionately.

Taken together, Burch's analyses in Chapter 6 and Burden and Vidal's in Chapter 5 show that interactions citizens have with the government have a strong effect on civic participation, and that effect is often not positive. In this same vein, in Chapter 7 Andrea Campbell examines how citizens' interactions with government agencies that administer social welfare policy affect civic participation. Campbell begins with a series of examples of policies that stimulate civic participation. A prime example is aid programs for senior citizens (e.g., Social Security and Medicare). Campbell explains that through these programs seniors of all SES backgrounds are provided with a steady income and health insurance. Given the high value of these benefits seniors became engaged with how the government administers them. And, given concomitant increases in seniors' resources and civic engagement because of social policies designed to help them, political organizations target them for recruitment (e.g., the AARP). Taken together, Campbell shows that aid programs for seniors increased their civic participation through the three elements of the CVM.

In contrast, Campbell shows that social welfare programs that assist the poor (e.g., program such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or "TANF") suppress civic voluntarism. Campbell shows that this process of civic deactivation also works through the three elements of the CVM. With

regard to resources, aid to the poor is far less generous in the United States than aid to seniors (and has become less so since the publication of *Voice and Equality*). Moreover, as programs to help the poor are “means-tested,” prospective recipients must prove to the government that they are eligible, which entails repeated interactions with government caseworkers. Campbell shows that these interactions lead aid recipients to develop negative views toward the government, which depresses civic engagement (e.g., unresponsive caseworkers and complex application forms decrease political efficacy). Finally, because they are disadvantaged in terms of resources and civic engagement, individuals on public assistance are less likely to be recruited to become civically active.

This all said, while Campbell identified the three elements of the CVM as mechanisms that cause public policy to either encourage or suppress civic participation, she also identifies a fourth factor outside of the model: “interpretive effects,” or how people feel they are viewed in the eyes of the government and wider society. In the case of aid to seniors, Campbell shows that these benefits are perceived as a reward for a lifetime of work, which leads to a positive self-image and a desire to give back to the community. In contrast, Campbell argues that paternalistic government programs such as TANF make recipients feel like “. . . passive subjects of government authority . . .” (p. 115) rather than welcome and active members of society. Taken together, Campbell concludes that “. . . policy designs may send messages to recipients about their worth as citizens, enhancing or undermining their feelings of belonging to the polity . . .” (p. 114).

In line with VSB’s more recent work on civic voluntarism (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012), Campbell concludes her chapter with the unsettling prediction that the choices politicians have made when designing social welfare policy in the United States have placed the public in a feedback loop of ever-increasing economic and political inequality. More specifically, she argues that public policies increase the resource divide between the rich and poor, which in turn increases political inequality between the rich and poor, which further feeds the resource divide.

Part III: Youth Civic Engagement in the Digital Age

Part III of this volume shifts focus to the participatory habits of the newest generation of American citizens. While it is known that civic participation increases with age and that older generations of Americans are currently more civically active than younger generations, age was not given much consideration as a correlate of civic activism in *Voice and Equality*. However, knowing that the participatory habits citizens form as young adults have a strong influence on their future rates of participation (Bartels and Jackman

2014), it is important to consider whether the CVM can inform our understanding of how the young are incorporated (or not) into American civil society and what this portends for the future.

In Chapter 8, Leticia Bode and colleagues examine this question within the context of social media. Bode et al. observe that parents are typically seen as the central agents of political socialization (i.e., the source of how the young learn about politics). For example, parents who are civically active tend to pass that behavior on to their children (e.g., VSB 1995, p. 417). However, online social networking services, such as Facebook and Twitter, and portable delivery devices, such as smartphones and tablets, did not exist when *Voice and Equality* was published. Today they are ubiquitous and used heavily by the young. This leads Bode et al. to question whether the parent-focused model of youth political socialization needs to be revised to include digital media as an additional source for how younger citizens learn about politics.

To test this proposition Bode et al. examine survey data collected from parents and their children over the course of the 2008 election. They find that parents play a strong role in socializing their children to politics. For example, there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between parental and child political participation over the course of the 2008 election (i.e., children modeled the behavior of their parents). Their data also show, however, that digital media had a strong influence on younger citizens. For example, even after accounting for parental socialization, consumption of online news media and use of Facebook for political purposes (e.g., “liking” a candidate) had a positive and statistically significant relationship with child political participation during the election.

Taken together, these results suggest VSB’s traditional understanding of political socialization as being driven by parents is still valid. However, as the Internet and social media become more pervasive, Bode et al.’s analysis shows that we need to refine our understanding of this process to include the influence of digital media. In line with the CVM, Bode et al. hypothesize that digital media have this influence because they provide the user with civic skills (e.g., develop rhetorical skills by debating politics in Facebook comments) and exposure to instances of recruitment (e.g., “liking” a candidate might lead the campaign to reach out to the user to make a donation, attend a rally, or vote).

In Chapter 9, Krista Jenkins and Molly Andolina expand upon the findings of Bode et al. by applying VSB’s concept of issue engagement (VSB 1995, Chapter 14) to the question of youth civic activism. More specifically, instead of focusing on agents of political socialization, they test whether specific types of internal motivations activate younger citizens to participate in civil society. While older citizens have been found to participate in civic life out of

habit (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Putnam 2000), given that younger citizens are new to the process Jenkins and Andolina hypothesize that motivations, not habit, will strongly influence whether and how they choose to become civically active.

To test this prediction Jenkins and Andolina use survey data collected from undergraduate students across the United States. They employ a variety of questions to develop two measures of motivations: issue-based motivations (e.g., the desire to affect government policy) and social motivations (e.g., to feel good about one's self, socialize with friends while being active, and the like). They find that college students were motivated to become civically active for social reasons. In line with the CVM, however, those who were also motivated by issues were of a higher SES background and, in line with Bode et al.'s analysis in Chapter 8, grew up with parents who were more civically active.

Having defined two types of civic motivations among college students, Jenkins and Andolina then examine how these feelings correlate with civic activism. Overall, college students who hold stronger social- or issue-based motivations are more civically active, though issue-based motivations are a more potent catalyst for civic activism compared to social motivations. Jenkins and Andolina also examine the relationship between these two types of motivations and four different types of civic activism: political (e.g., working for a political candidate), civic (e.g., volunteering in the community), cognitive (e.g., consumption of news media), and expressive (e.g., discussing politics with others). They find that both forms of motivation correlate with all four types of civic activism, even when they are accounted for simultaneously and, in line with Bode et al.'s results in Chapter 8, even after accounting for parental socialization.

All told, Jenkins and Andolina's analysis demonstrates that motivations matter a great deal to whether and how the newest generation of American citizens chooses to become active in civil society. From a normative perspective their results suggest a bright future for civic life in the United States, as college students' desire to affect policy (i.e., a collective good) appears to be a more potent motivation behind civic activity than personal motivations (i.e., self-interest). These results also suggest that the primacy of resources over engagement in the CVM may not be entirely accurate. To wit, resource-rich individuals will probably not choose to spend their time, money, and skills on civic activism if they are not motivated to do so. Granted, VSB showed that civically engaged individuals will not become active in civil society if they lack the resources to do so. At the very least, however, Jenkins and Andolina's analysis shows that motivations are also critical in determining whether a person becomes civically active and what types of activities they choose to engage in.

Part IV: New Theories and Methods of Inquiry

The final part of this volume sheds new light on the CVM by making use of new theories and methods of inquiry that were not yet available, or were in relatively limited use, when *Voice and Equality* was published. In Chapter 10, Allison Anoll and Melissa Michelson discuss the use of “get out the vote” (GOTV) field experiments in the study of voter turnout. This relatively new method—its first use in political science was by Gerber and Green (2000)—randomly assigns potential voters to either be recruited to vote (i.e., the “treatment” group) or not (i.e., the “control” group). As voter turnout records are publicly available in the United States, the efficacy of these recruitment efforts can be determined by comparing the turnout rate of individuals who were recruited to that of those who were not.

As discussed by Anoll and Michelson, numerous studies using the field experiment method have found that GOTV efforts stimulate turnout, but with varied effectiveness contingent on the mode of contact (e.g., in-person appeals tend to work better than requests over the phone), the message embedded in the contact (e.g., messages perceived as too forceful can backfire), and the target audience (e.g., likely voters are easier to recruit). Based on their assessment of this growing literature, Anoll and Michelson agree with VSB that recruitment efforts are typically targeted at individuals with higher levels of resources and civic engagement because they are easier to mobilize. Anoll and Michelson also argue, however, that the field experiment literature shows that citizens who are less likely to vote can be recruited successfully. That is, in line with the argument made by García Bedolla and Sánchez Loza in Chapter 2 with regard to mobilizing Latino voters, field experimentation methods reveal that the CVM underestimates the importance of recruitment.

In Chapter 11, Yanna Krupnikov and Adam Seth Levine switch focus from recruitment (an influence that is exogenous to, or outside of, the individual) to discuss how the growing subfield of political psychology has integrated psychological factors (an endogenous, or internal, influence) into the study of civic voluntarism. In their discussion of this literature, Krupnikov and Levine show how the theories and methods of psychology can be used to increase our understanding of the way resources, engagement, and recruitment stimulate civic participation (or fail to do so).

With regard to resources, Krupnikov and Levine highlight the disconnection that exists in the human mind between objective measures and perceptions of resources. More specifically, no matter how resource-rich people are, if they feel that they cannot or are unable to spend their time, money, and civic skills on civic participation, they likely will not do so. For example, Krupnikov and Levine show that social comparison theory (e.g., Festinger

1954) helps explain why people with equal amounts of civic skills would be more willing to participate in some contexts than in others. More specifically, a person with moderate civic skills who is surrounded by peers with low civic skills is likely to perceive him- or herself as highly skilled in a relative sense, and is thus more likely to become civically active. In contrast, if individuals with high civic skills surrounded this same person, he or she would judge him- or herself in a less positive light and would be less likely to become civically active.

With regard to engagement, while VSB found a number of demographics that correlate with this factor, most notably income and education, Krupnikov and Levine show that psychological factors not considered in *Voice and Equality* can further clarify who among us feels compelled to express our civic voice. For example, the personality trait “openness to experience” (e.g., the preference for novelty, curiosity, and the like) and the cognitive “need to evaluate” (e.g., the impulse to form opinions while assessing new information) are both correlated with civic engagement. Krupnikov and Levine also show how these psychological processes are mediated by sociopolitical context. For example, work on social identity theory shows that individuals who identify more strongly as Americans are more likely to be civically engaged. As such, a political candidate can use rhetoric and imagery to “tap into” that identity to activate voters’ engagement (e.g., use of the American flag in campaign advertisements). In this same vein, and in line with Jenkins and Andolina’s analysis of motivations in Chapter 9, Krupnikov and Levine also point out that research on social identity theory shows that believing that one has a stake in the outcome of a particular issue increases engagement with that issue (e.g., senior citizens have a shared identity because of their shared interest in protecting Social Security, and thus many join advocacy groups like the AARP).

With regard to recruitment, Krupnikov and Levine show that the long tradition of psychology research on persuasion can illuminate our understanding of the conditions that facilitate (or hamper) these efforts. For example, the perceived credibility of the source of the recruitment request is critical, and this perception is more likely to be positive if the sender and recipient of the request have a shared social identity (e.g., belong to the same political party, racial or ethnic group, gender, and the like).

Taken together, Krupnikov and Levine’s analysis of resources, engagement, and recruitment shows that concepts developed by psychologists increase our understanding of how the three elements of the CVM operate. In Chapter 12, Zoltán Fazekas and Peter Hatemi take this argument a step further by showing how psychological factors (among others) are influenced by our genes. Fazekas and Hatemi discuss how political scientists started to use the research techniques of behavior genetics in the mid-2000s. Since then,

a growing amount of evidence suggests that many elements of the CVM, including political interest, efficacy, occupational prestige, and educational attainment, are heritable. To be clear, Fazekas and Hatemi explain that behavior genetics scholars have not discovered a “civic participation gene.” Instead, research in this tradition shows that many of the characteristics (i.e., phenotypes) that correlate with civic participation are genetically informed, and expression of these phenotypes is influenced by suites of genes as opposed to a single one. Moreover, Fazekas and Hatemi are careful to note that expression of phenotypes is not deterministic because the process is also affected by one’s environment, not just one’s genes.

To illustrate these points empirically, Fazekas and Hatemi present an original analysis using twin study data.⁵ These data show that political participation is heritable. More specifically, their analysis estimates that approximately 40 percent of the variation in political participation can be attributed to genetic sources, with the remaining 60 percent attributable to the unique environmental influences experienced by each individual twin (e.g., parental socialization).

To test for the possibility of gene-environment interactions in their data, Fazekas and Hatemi examine whether the heritability of political participation varies by “material status” (i.e., in line with Krupnikov and Levine’s discussion of perceived resources in Chapter 11, the subjective perception of one’s ability to cover his or her expenses). They find that the influence of genetics on political participation declines as material status increases. That is, in line with the CVM, because it is easier for people with high levels of resources to participate in politics, they are more likely to do so regardless of their genetic predispositions. In contrast, individuals of more meager means face greater barriers to participating in politics, and as such are more influenced by their genetic predispositions to be (or not to be) politically active.

Taken together, Fazekas and Hatemi offer us a more comprehensive understanding of the CVM by showing that our genes influence whether we obtain resources, feel a sense of civic engagement, and place ourselves in environments where we are subject to recruitment. Otherwise stated, the research techniques of behavior genetics provide us with a deeper glimpse into the sources of participatory inequality by showing that only some of us are predisposed genetically to have the means, motives, and opportunities to be civically active.

5. Identical twins share 100 percent of the same genetic material, while fraternal twins share approximately 50 percent. Consequently, if identical twins are more similar to each other than are fraternal twins for a given phenotype, this is evidence that the phenotype is heritable. See Fazekas and Hatemi’s chapter for a more detailed explanation of this research method.

In Chapter 13, Sara Chatfield and John Henderson switch focus to the relationship between educational attainment and civic participation. While *Voice and Equality* treated this relationship as ironclad, in the decades since its publication the validity of this relationship has been questioned. To resolve this debate Chatfield and Henderson suggest a two-pronged approach: better theories and more sophisticated research methods. With regard to theory, they argue for the need to specify more carefully the causal mechanisms that might underlay the relationship between education and participation. They suggest three such pathways: individual-level, network, and “education-as-proxy” effects. Individual-level effects refer to politically relevant experiences a person has in school, such as the cultivation of civic skills (e.g., developing communication skills). Network effects refer to the social ties with like-minded individuals that one develops at school. For example, as discussed in *Voice and Equality*, the literature on social capital (e.g., Putnam 2000), and the growing literature on social networks (e.g., Klofstad 2011), instances of recruitment are likely to occur in these networks. Finally, proxy effects are the preferred explanation of critics of the relationship between education and participation, whereby education is a stand-in for other variables, such as parental socialization, that are actually influencing participation (Kam and Palmer 2008).

To adjudicate between these potential mechanisms, Chatfield and Henderson suggest that more precise measures of the educational experience are needed. They put this advice into action through an analysis of survey data based on new measures of educational experience: whether college coursework was completed in person or online (i.e., Did attending in person enable the development of social networks that stimulate participation?), collegiate major (i.e., Are majors relevant to politics, such as the social sciences, more influential on participation?), and educational debt (i.e., Are students with more debt, and thus fewer resources, less civically active?). Their analysis shows that while online education is correlated with lower levels of civic engagement and participation, student debt and collegiate major had little systematic influence on engagement or participation. These findings suggest that if the goal of higher education is to encourage not only intellectual development but also active citizenship, the mode of instruction needs to be considered carefully.

Conclusion

Civic voluntarism is at the core of participatory democracy, and as such it is incumbent upon us to understand its causes (or, as VSB would likely suggest, the barriers that prevent us from participating in civic life). In the remainder of this volume the authors highlight in greater detail how the

CVM continues to define our understanding of this important topic, both because of the questions it has answered and for the questions it has generated that we continue to wrestle with today. The volume concludes with a chapter from VSB that discusses the theoretical and empirical framework behind *Voice and Equality*, what they would have done differently were they to design their study today, and suggestions for new avenues of research on civic voluntarism.

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