INTRODUCTION

Latin America’s urban poor are often portrayed as the innocent victims of repressive and exclusionary regimes.\(^1\) Victims they undoubtedly are; innocent, however, they are not. Indeed, there is increasing evidence from a variety of contexts that the urban poor have been active, organized, and aggressive participants in the political process and that popular organizations, in particular, have had a significant impact on the relationship between the urban poor and political elites.\(^2\)

Two Favelas

This book tells the story of Vila Brasil and Vidigal, two favelas, or slum neighborhoods, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.\(^3\) It tells of their constant struggle for survival, of their unceasing efforts to organize, and of their longstanding and complex relationship with local politicians and administrators. To the outsider, the two favelas appear very much the same. Both are settled illegally on plots of privately owned land,
both are inhabited by individuals and families that are unable to afford accommodation in the formal housing market, and both enjoy only limited and substandard access to a range of basic urban services. On closer inspection, however, the two favelas are significantly different.

Vila Brasil is one of many favelas in Rio that pursue their interests by exchanging votes for favors. This means that before every election the president of Vila Brasil's neighborhood association makes it known that the favela will vote en masse for the highest bidder among all candidates for public office. The president's strategy has proven to be highly successful over the course of the past ten years or so. In fact, it has been largely responsible for the transformation of Vila Brasil into one of the best-served favelas in the region.

The neighborhood association in Vidigal has also had its fair share of success. It is not, however, in the business of selling votes, and it steadfastly refuses to support candidates of the kind that are regularly entertained by the president of Vila Brasil. The leaders of the neighborhood association in Vidigal make it known that no one will be allowed to campaign in the area on the basis of what he or she has done for the favela in the past or promises to do in the future. This does not mean that public works and personal gifts to the community are not rewarded at the ballot box but that the neighborhood association refuses to encourage, facilitate, or endorse such forms of political behavior.

The difference between the two favelas' political strategies can be explained in terms of the different relationship that developed between the leadership of their respective neighborhood associations and the so-called popular movement that confronted the military in Rio de Janeiro in the late 1970s and early 1980s. To many, the mobilization of popular protest represented an interesting but largely inconsequential stage in the transition to democracy. To others, it heralded the dawn of a new political era. Whatever its larger implications, the mobilization of popular protest had a profound and lasting impact on the social and political life of the population of many of Rio's five hundred or so favelas.

The emergence of a popular movement in Rio meant that the residents of Vidigal were able to challenge and eventually overcome an attempt to remove the community from its present site in October 1977.
It also meant that what subsequently emerged as the leadership of the favela was exposed to a very different vision of the political process. In Vila Brasil, the emergence of a popular movement also led to important changes in the political organization of the favela, but in ways that both challenged and reinforced the relationship between the population of Vila Brasil and political elites.

This difference between the two favelas is important for two reasons. First, it determines both the nature and the broader consequences of each favela’s participation in the political process. The success of the president of Vila Brasil in profiting from elections means that his many followers in the favela tend to support candidates who will buy their way into public office but who have little real concern for the plight of the urban poor. It also means that voters in Vila Brasil are less likely to support candidates who refuse to or are unable to buy votes. Promises of a better life or of a more just society ten or fifteen years down the road tend to fall on deaf ears in the favela. Voters in Vila Brasil are more concerned with the here and now, with the supply of electricity and water to the favela and with the concrete concerns of everyday favela life.

By way of contrast, the decision of the leadership of Vidigal to turn its back on patronage politics and to pursue its interests via alternative channels means that voters in the favela face very different political issues. The neighborhood association in Vidigal is no longer dependent on selling votes and, as a consequence, is no longer as susceptible to attempts at political blackmail. In Vidigal, therefore, the cycle of dependency has been broken. To do well as a politician in Vidigal, it is necessary to talk not only about the provision of electricity and water in the favela but also about the more general issues of wages, police violence, education, and health care.

This difference between the two favelas is also important, however, in that it reveals that popular political participation is as much the product of collective organization and resistance as it is of the actions and decisions of politicians and administrators. And, as such, this book is not solely, or even primarily, about two favelas in Rio de Janeiro but is also about the many different forms of popular organization, about the changing nature of the relationship between popular organizations
and political elites, and about the role of popular organizations in the process of political change.

**Popular Organization and Political Change**

The 1985 inauguration of Tancredo Neves as Brazil’s first civilian president in twenty-one years marked the end of a long and uncertain transition to democracy. The final stages of this transition witnessed the emergence of an increasingly organized and vocal popular movement. The popular movement consisted of a bewildering array of different elements, from labor unions and professional organizations to neighborhood associations and church groups. The popular movement was important in that it provided a measure of resistance to the regime, played a prominent role in the organization of a number of large-scale public protests, and formed the basis for a new political party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), in 1979.⁴

The emergence of a popular movement and the explosion of popular protest against the authoritarian regime led some to predict that the withdrawal of the military would be accompanied by a transformation in the nature of Brazilian politics and a shift in the balance of class power. The hope was that the popular movement would destroy the legitimacy of the authoritarian state; undermine popular support for elitist political parties; and sweep the radical, democratic Left to power.⁵

The return to democracy proved something of a disappointment, however. It was accompanied by widespread popular demobilization, by the eclipse of the political Left, by the continued success of politicians with close ties to the military regime, and by the resurgence of political leaders from Brazil’s preauthoritarian past. It appeared, therefore, that the proliferation of popular organizations and the explosion of popular protest in the late 1970s and early 1980s had little impact on the nature of postauthoritarian politics.⁶

Elements of continuity between postauthoritarian, authoritarian, and even preauthoritarian Brazil have meant that accounts of the past two decades have largely ignored the role of popular organization and protest
and focused instead on the decisions and actions of political elites.\textsuperscript{7} This concern with the role of elites is by no means a product of the recent transition, however. Rather, it reflects the widely held belief that Brazil's participation in the world economy has given rise to a social-class structure that is characterized by a strong interventionist state and a weak and disorganized civil society.\textsuperscript{8} Missing from this explanation, however, is an appreciation of the tension, or dynamic, inherent in the relationship between civil and political society in Brazil, a tension that reflects the way in which the popular classes were incorporated into the political process.

The exposure of what was essentially a primary product economy to the effects of capitalist competition in the core resulted in a delayed and somewhat restricted pattern of industrialization in Brazil and the emergence of a dispersed, heterogeneous, and largely unorganized working class.\textsuperscript{9} As a consequence, working-class enfranchisement and political participation were initiated and, to a certain extent, constrained by elites competing for control of the state. The principal forms of popular political participation in contemporary Brazilian politics, clientelism and populism, continue to reflect this logic.\textsuperscript{10}

Clientelism is a somewhat expansive concept that refers to particularistic and hierarchical exchange relationships between actors of different social status and wealth. As such, it encompasses both the relationship between lord and vassal in the countryside and the more contemporary and increasingly urban forms of face-to-face exchange between politician and voter.\textsuperscript{11} Populism, on the other hand, refers to elite-led, multi-class mass movements of marginal or hitherto excluded groups in civil society. Like clientelism, however, populism is essentially a votes-for-patronage strategy based on the monopoly and selective distribution of public goods and the protection and expansion of political turf. Therefore, it too involves elements of political mobilization and control.\textsuperscript{12}

Both clientelism and populism have been prominent and enduring features of the political landscape in Brazil.\textsuperscript{13} More important, however, they have provided institutional mechanisms for interaction, exchange, and solidarity between elites and masses. The notion that civil society in Brazil is somehow weak, therefore, is essentially incorrect, the truth
being that civil and political society are arranged, or articulated, in such a way as to make popular political organization on the basis of social class extremely difficult.\textsuperscript{14}

Although enduring, such relationships are rarely stable, however, in the sense that patterns of interaction, exchange, and solidarity between elites and masses are subject to a never-ending process of challenge, adjustment, and renegotiation.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, it is the challenge, adjustment, and renegotiation of the relationship between civil and political society in Brazil that, perhaps more than anything else, holds the key to political change. And it is within this context that the events of the late 1970s and early 1980s that are dealt with in this book are of particular significance.\textsuperscript{16}

Of course, the relationship between elites and masses and between civil and political society is an issue of central and longstanding interest to sociologists and social scientists in general, and certainly is not one that is idiosyncratic to the Brazilian case.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, from Latin America to the postcommunist regimes of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to the newly industrializing states of Southeast Asia, democracy has been embraced as a social, political, and economic panacea. It is already more than clear, however, that the establishment of basic political rights is a historic yet relatively small victory in the struggle for a more substantive form of social democracy that goes beyond participation at the ballot box. Thus, while this book is about the relationship between the urban poor and political elites in Rio de Janeiro, it is also a contribution toward the increasingly lively and compelling debate about political transitions, popular organization, and democracy in other parts of the globe.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Popular Organization and the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro}

Of the many different areas of Brazil that witnessed the emergence of a popular movement, Rio de Janeiro is perhaps the most interesting. Rio was the site of a number of large-scale public acts of protest against the military regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Rio also witnessed the
TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Favela Population</th>
<th>Rate of Growth of Favela Population (%)</th>
<th>Population of Rio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>169,305</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2,336,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>335,063</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>3,307,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>565,135</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>4,285,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>722,424</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>5,180,413</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


proliferation of popular organizations, primarily in the form of neighborhood associations. Finally, and most important, in Rio, perhaps more than elsewhere in Brazil, the popular movement extended its reach to the poorest, most severely disadvantaged elements of society, to the population of the city’s innumerable and rapidly expanding favelas.

Popular visions of Rio inspire images of a steamy tropical paradise, of a busy cosmopolitan city surrounded by sun, sea, and vast stretches of golden sand. The reality of the place is rather different. A relatively small and physically compact area of the city corresponds to photographs that adorn travel brochures across the globe. Much of Rio and its hinterland, however, is violent, unserviced, and extremely poor. In fact, somewhere in the region of 14 percent of Rio’s over six million inhabitants live in the five hundred or so favelas that dominate the city’s urban landscape.19

Table 1 reveals that the population of Rio’s favelas has been increasing steadily over the past few decades, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the population of the city itself. Table 1 also shows that the rate of population growth in the favelas has slowed somewhat since the 1960s. This is, in part, because rates of immigration and population growth in the region have recently been on the decline. It is also, however, because a large number of favelas were physically removed in the 1960s and 1970s and because there is now little room for expansion in
TABLE 2
Favela Population of Rio de Janeiro by Region, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Favela Population</th>
<th>% of Total Regional Population</th>
<th>% of Total Municipal Favela Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central/South</td>
<td>205,977</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>417,527</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>98,920</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>722,424</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: In this table, the Central/South region consists of the administrative regions (RAs) of Copacabana, Botafogo, Lagoa, Centro, Tijuca, Vila Isabel, Santa Teresa, Rio Comprido, São Cristóvão, and Portuária. The North Region consists of the RAs of Engenho Novo, Méier, Ramos, Irajá, Madureira, Anchieta, Penha, Ilha do Governador, and Paquetá. The West region consists of the RAs of Jacarepaguá, Barra da Tijuca, Campo Grande, Santa Cruz, and Bangu.


existing favelas. The saturation of space in the favelas of Rio has meant that the urban poor have been pushed increasingly toward the periphery as ever greater numbers are forced to pursue substandard housing options at ever greater distances from the city center.20

Table 2 shows how unevenly distributed throughout Rio de Janeiro the favela population is. By far the highest concentrations are to be found in the industrial and commercial districts to the north of the city center. (See Map 1.) In fact, in 1980, somewhere in the region of 19 percent of the population of northern Rio resided in favelas, a figure that exceeded 50 percent in some neighborhoods. A far smaller proportion of the city’s favela population live in the southern and central parts of the city. This is not because the areas in and around the city center and wealthy residential districts are any less desirable but because in the past such areas have been consistent targets for the removal of favelas.

Table 2 also reveals that the western and most distant neighborhoods
Map 1. The Municipality of Rio de Janeiro with Inset of Brazil
TABLE 3
Distribution of Favelas of Rio de Janeiro by Size, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Inhabitants</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1000</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>82,073</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001–5000</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>248,436</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;5000</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>391,915</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>722,424</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


of Rio house an even smaller percentage of the city’s favela population. This region is rapidly becoming the poorest in the municipality, however. Many of those who were removed from favelas in the central districts of the city in the 1960s and 1970s were relocated to the vast and now dilapidated public-housing projects that litter the region, and in recent years the western districts more than any other part of Rio have witnessed the proliferation of new favelas and the establishment of illegal subdivisions.21

Table 3 shows that the majority of the favelas in Rio are small settlements of less than a thousand people and that, despite their number, they account for a relatively insignificant proportion of the city’s favela population. The few really large favelas, on the other hand, account for the vast majority of the city’s favela population. Most of these large favelas can be found in the northern parts of the city, often in close proximity to each other. The largest of these favela agglomerations, an area in Ramos known as Maré, houses an estimated 65,000 people.22 The largest single favela in Rio is Rocinha. Located on prime real estate in the heart of one of the city’s wealthiest residential districts, the population of Rocinha is estimated to be somewhere between the official estimate of 35,000 and the popular estimate of 200,000!23

Finally, Table 4 reveals that while the settlement of new favelas in
### TABLE 4
Distribution of Favelas of Rio de Janeiro by Year of Occupation, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Occupation</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1920</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921–1940</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941–1960</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961–1981</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rio has continued apace over a period of sixty years or so, the majority were built before 1960. Most of the earliest favelas were established in the southern part of the city. Since then, however, the locus of favela settlement has shifted to the northern and, more recently, the western districts of Rio. This pattern of settlement reflects both the impact of eradication programs in the 1960s and 1970s and the saturation of space for the establishment of new favelas on land close to the city center.

Like similar settlements in other parts of the globe, the favelas of Rio were, and still are, built on vacant plots of private or government-owned land. As such, they have been under almost constant threat of removal and have been denied all but the most basic urban services. Over time, however, all but a few favelas have undergone a process of urbanization, either through government intervention or as a result of the organization of self-help projects. Either way, the quality of services in even the most urbanized of Rio’s favelas falls far short of standards required of “regular” neighborhoods in surrounding areas. A survey of 364 favelas in Rio in 1981, for example, found that while the majority enjoyed some form of piped water provision, only 6 percent drew their water from an officially installed system. The survey also found that 32 percent of the favelas that were surveyed relied almost exclusively on water drawn from springs, wells, or water outlets.
The collection of sewage in Rio’s favelas is even more precarious. Only 14 percent of the 364 favelas surveyed in 1981 reported that their communities were served by a fairly extensive sewage system, and only 1 percent reported that they enjoyed access to an officially installed system. Fully 62 percent, on the other hand, said that there was no sewage collection to speak of in the favela, and in 48 percent raw sewage flowed through the streets in open ditches. In all but a few cases, sewage ditches also served as drainage channels for rainwater. This means that during the rainy season the sewage ditches commonly flood their banks into adjacent houses. The combination of inadequate drainage, the accumulation of garbage, and the precarious construction of the majority of the buildings in Rio’s favelas also means that the rainy season is accompanied by the very real threat of major and often fatal landslides.

The favelas of Rio are also at a severe disadvantage in terms of a range of other basic urban services. They seldom enjoy more than limited access to the most basic educational and medical facilities, are located far from major commercial centers, and are more often than not badly served by transportation networks. The majority of the favelas are also unpoliced, and it is largely because they have been abandoned by the state that they have increasingly fallen prey to elements involved in the drug trade. All but a few favelas in the city of Rio provide cover for armed gangs that peddle cocaine and marijuana to local elites, to tourists, and, increasingly, to the inhabitants of the favelas themselves. These gangs are often the perpetrators of extreme violence in their dealings with local police, who are themselves often involved in the buying and selling of drugs, and in their dealings with rival gangs. They are also, however, a source of welfare in their own favelas, playing the occasional role of Robin Hood in return for public support and the protection of anonymity.

As one might expect, the population of Rio’s favelas consists primarily of the poorer working-class elements of carioca (Rio) society, although in recent years there has been a slow but noticeable influx of middle-class families into such areas. Although data are scarce, surveys of individual favelas in Rio have found that the vast majority of the population is gainfully employed (women less so than men) in a wide variety of different unskilled or semiskilled occupations associated pri-
marily with the city’s service economy. These same surveys have also found considerable variation in household income in the favelas, with a median that is somewhere in the region of one-and-a-half to five minimum salaries.\textsuperscript{31}

Not surprisingly, the population of Rio’s favelas is also among the least educated elements of carioca society. Surveys have revealed that the majority of the present-day adult population of the favelas left school well before completing primary school and that only a small percentage completed secondary school or enrolled in higher education. The educational profile of the favelas is changing somewhat with the influx of middle-class elements into such areas and with the tendency for younger members of the population to stay in school longer. It is still the case, however, that the majority of young adults leave before completing their high school education.\textsuperscript{32}

The many disadvantages faced by the favelas and the harsh and often tragic nature of favela life have taught the population of such areas to fend for itself. Over the years, therefore, the population of the favelas has devised any number of strategies for ensuring its survival, from attaching itself to political elites to organizing popular protest. At the center of these efforts has been the neighborhood association. All but a few of the favelas in existence in Rio today boast a neighborhood association. As we shall see, however, these organizations have played very different roles at different junctures in the region’s long and checkered political history.\textsuperscript{33}
No visitor to Rio can fail to be impressed by the contrast between the
city’s stunning physical beauty and the squalor of much of its urban
environment, so much so that a visit to one of the region’s favelas has
become an essential stop on many a tour. It is as if the city has finally
come to terms with the fact that the favelas are a permanent and essen-
tial feature of everyday life. If such an accommodation exists, however,
it is both fragile and of recent origin. For until the mid 1970s, the favelas
had been widely regarded as a form of cancer to be cut out and removed.

All attempts to rid Rio of its favelas have ended in failure, however.
They have failed for many of the same reasons that similar policies have
failed elsewhere in Latin America: rapid rates of population growth
and rural-to-urban migration, rising levels of urban unemployment and
underemployment, reliance by a significant element of the local politi-
cal elite on the population of the favelas as a cheap source of votes,
and, finally, the increasing adeptness of the residents of Rio’s favelas
themselves to articulate and defend their own interests.

The evolution of what is a longstanding and complex relationship be-
tween the population of Rio’s favelas and political elites can be divided
into four relatively distinct periods: the initial emergence and consolidation of the favelas (1850–1945), attempts by local elites to enlist the population of the favelas' political support (1945–62), efforts to physically remove all favelas from the city (1962–74), and finally, the attempt by local elites to rearticulate the relationship between the population of the favelas and the newly democratic state (1974–86).

**Urbanization, Urban Poverty, and the Favelas:**

### 1850–1945

The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the transformation of the city of Rio de Janeiro from a sleepy colonial entrepôt to the undisputed commercial, financial, administrative, and cultural center of Brazil's Old Republic. This transformation was accompanied, however, by a dramatic increase in the size of Rio's urban working class and the emergence of a severe housing crisis.¹

The presence of an increasingly large and unruly working class and the unsanitary nature of much of Rio's low-income housing moved local governing elites to consider ways of removing and relocating the urban poor. One way was to persuade industrialists to provide housing for their workers. This option was pursued by the state in the late 1880s and resulted in the construction of a token number of *vilas operárias* by local textile manufacturers, bankers, and construction firms.² Another way was the physical removal of working-class housing from downtown Rio and the forced relocation of the urban poor to the suburbs. This option was pursued by the state in 1904 when it embarked on a massive program of urban redevelopment.³ Urban redevelopment did little to resolve the issue of housing for the urban poor, however. It simply meant that the occupants of working-class hostels and boarding houses in downtown Rio found similar accommodation elsewhere in the city or that they staked their claim to a plot of land in the favelas that subsequently emerged on Rio's hillsides.⁴

Over the next thirty years or so, both the number and the population of Rio's favelas increased steadily as dislocations associated with World War I, the Great Depression, the eclipse of the local coffee economy, and
substantial rates of internal and international migration combined to swell the ranks of the country’s then capital city. Then in 1937, the state passed legislation prohibiting the construction of new dwellings and the physical improvement of existing dwellings in the favelas. It was not until 1937, therefore, that the state officially recognized that the favelas were more than a temporary solution to problems associated with rapid rates of urbanization.

The attempt by the state to restrict the expansion of existing favelas in Rio was accompanied in the early 1940s by wholesale favela removal and by further attempts to provide subsidized low-income housing. The outcome was the construction in 1942 of three highly publicized public-housing projects known as Parques Proletários. The Parques Proletários were more than public-housing projects, however, in that they were designed not only to accommodate but also to isolate and control the urban poor. For example, each resident was issued an identification card that was to be presented on entry to the parks’ gates, which were then closed for the night at ten o’clock. At nine o’clock the administrator of each park would use a loudspeaker system to lecture his wards on issues of public morality.

The Parques Proletários were not a great success, in the sense that the population that was removed from the city’s favelas far exceeded the small number of housing units that were made available. The Parques Proletários were important, however, in that they were indicative of the way that local elites understood and hoped to address the problem of urban poverty in Rio.

The Beginnings of Popular Political Participation: 1945–62

The overthrow of Getúlio Vargas and the establishment of popular democracy in Brazil in 1945 meant something of a change in the relationship between the state and the population of the favelas in Rio in that it brought an end to the more authoritarian solutions to the problem of urban poverty. Instead of simply removing the favelas, the state and the Catholic church in Rio now sought to encourage the physical con-
solidation and political organization of favela neighborhoods in situ. This change in state policy and the involvement of the Catholic church owed less to a newfound commitment to the principles of democracy, however, than to a generalized fear of the massed ranks of the urban working class. Essentially, therefore, the consolidation and organization of the favelas in Rio were pursued as a means of political control.

Of particular concern was the possibility that an increasingly large and marginal favela population would provide a rich source of votes for the Partido Comunista (PC). The PC fared surprisingly well in municipal elections in Rio in 1947, and it was largely the specter of a communist-inspired urban revolt, made all the more real by the postwar freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union, that prompted the creation of church and state agencies with a mandate to intervene in the favelas. The most important of these institutions were the Fundação Leão XIII, created in 1947; the Cruzada São Sebastião, created in 1955; and the Serviço Especial de Recuperação de Favelas e Habitações Anti-Higiénicas (SERFHA), created one year later.

All three institutions contributed to the physical consolidation of the favelas in that they were responsible for designing, financing, and implementing a wide variety of small public works projects. All three institutions were also involved in the organization and political orientation of neighborhood associations in the favelas. Ultimately, however, the activities of the Fundação Leão XIII, the Cruzada São Sebastião, and SERFHA were compromised to serve the interests of specific and often competing political elites.

Of particular significance in this regard was the emergence of Carlos Lacerda as a prominent member of the anti-Vargas coalition in Rio during the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1948 Lacerda launched an attack on federal government policy toward the favelas in Rio, arguing that problems associated with urban poverty could no longer be resolved by purely repressive means. In this sense, Lacerda's understanding of the problem of the favelas mirrored that which led to the creation of the Fundação Leão XIII, the Cruzada São Sebastião, and SERFHA. In 1960, however, Lacerda was elected governor of the recently created state of Guanabara following the transfer of the nation's capital to Brasília. Within two years of taking office, Lacerda effectively silenced the
Cruzada São Sebastião, assumed control of the Fundação Leão XIII, and abolished SERFHA.\textsuperscript{13}

It was not that Lacerda opposed state intervention in the favelas—far from it. It was a question of who reaped the benefits of this process. In the case of the Fundação Leão XIII and the Cruzada São Sebastião, Lacerda’s intent was to bring an end to the activities of institutions that were not under his personal political control. In the case of SERFHA, Lacerda was under considerable pressure from members of the local political elite, who claimed that the agency was interfering with their role as intermediaries between the population of the favelas and the state.\textsuperscript{14}

In an era when little could be done without the personal intervention of a member of the political elite, elected officials, public administrators, and candidates for public office in Rio exploited the lack of basic urban services in the favelas and the ever-present threat of removal as a cheap source of votes. They did this by patronizing local sports and social clubs, by sponsoring small public works projects, and by greasing the palm of local favela leaders. These leaders, otherwise known as cabos eleitorais, then worked as intermediaries between political elites and the population of the favelas at large and were responsible for turning out the vote on election day.\textsuperscript{15}

The residents of Rio’s favelas, for their part, had little choice but to participate in this process by courting the favor of politicians and public administrators. Over time, however, many leaders of favelas in Rio learned to take advantage of what was clearly an unequal and exploitative relationship by demanding more for their votes and by holding out for the highest bidder. More important was the fact that by the early 1960s a small but nonetheless significant number of neighborhood associations in Rio were refusing to accept any form of mediation between the population of the favelas and the state. SERFHA, under the tutelage of José Artur Rios, was partly responsible for this in that it had been promoting the organization of neighborhood associations in Rio that were independent of both political elites and state institutions. And it was this, more than anything, that led to SERFHA’s demise at the hands of Carlos Lacerda in 1962.
Authoritarian Solutions: 1962–74

In 1962, the relationship between the population of the favelas and political elites in Rio took a decided turn for the worse in that demands for the revitalization of local capital and real estate markets were met by wholesale favela removal. The outcome was that between 1962 and 1974, an estimated 139,218 residents from eighty different favelas in Rio were forced to abandon their homes for publicly financed housing projects on the outskirts of the city.¹⁶

The removal of the favelas was facilitated, at the national level, by the intervention of the military in 1964 and by the end of any attempt, symbolic or otherwise, to include nonelite groups in the decision-making process. At the local level, it was facilitated by a series of administrative maneuvers that closed off avenues of potential conflict between the population of the favelas and the state and that reduced to a purely technical and administrative level the problem of relocating large numbers of the urban poor.¹⁷ This meant that agencies that had been promoting the consolidation of the favelas were abruptly discontinued or redepolyed while others were created to make way for wholesale favela removal.

Of particular importance in this regard were the abolition of SERFHA, the subordination of the Fundação Leão XIII to the authority of the local state, and the devolution of public responsibility for the favelas to the recently created administrative regions (RAs). Of more importance, however, was the creation in 1962 of the Cooperativa de Habitação Popular do Estado da Guanabara (COHAB). COHAB’s mandate called for the removal and urbanization of selected favelas in Rio and for the construction of a large number of low-income housing units for the urban poor. As it turned out, however, COHAB was almost solely responsible for the first wave of favela removals, such that between 1962 and 1965 it accounted for the relocation of 42,000 residents from twenty-seven different favelas in Rio to public-housing projects in the suburbs.¹⁸

The association between authoritarian politics and authoritarian solutions was never absolute, however, as state policy toward the urban poor in Rio continued to reflect the interests of competing political elites. Thus, in 1968 a new agency, the Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidade (CODESCO), for state intervention in the favelas was cre-
ated with considerable financial backing from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). CODESCO was controlled by Lacerda’s successor as governor of the state of Guanabara, Francisco Negrão de Lima (1965–71), who, as a member of the political opposition to the military, favored the consolidation of the favelas.

In 1968 CODESCO sponsored the urbanization of three favelas in Rio de Janeiro, involving the regularization of land rights and the installation of lighting, water, and sewage systems. CODESCO’s success was short-lived, however, since four months after its creation the military government established yet another agency to intervene in the favelas, the Coordenadoria da Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro (CHISAM). CHISAM was created with the expressed intention of resolving the tension between COHAB and CODESCO in Rio and of reestablishing the eradication of the favelas as the number-one policy priority. The outcome was that between 1968 and 1973, CHISAM was responsible for the removal of a further 90,000 residents from fifty different favelas, primarily from the wealthier districts of the city.

Few dared protest state policy toward the favelas, and popular resistance to the removal process was quickly and often brutally repressed. In March 1963, however, a group of favela leaders from the northern districts of the city joined forces to form the Federação de Associações de Favelas do Estado da Guanabara (FAFEG), which by 1968 claimed to represent 72 of the 132 neighborhood associations then in existence. The creation of a federation of favelas in Rio was important in that it led to the organization of two statewide favela neighborhood association congresses in 1964 and 1968 and in that it facilitated the mobilization of popular protest against the removal process. Ultimately, however, FAFEG’s ability to resist the removal process was severely restricted by state government decrees in 1967 and 1969 that ruled that only one officially recognized neighborhood association was to be allowed in each favela or housing project. These decrees gave the state ample opportunity to intervene in the affairs of recalcitrant favela organizations, so by the end of the 1960s FAFEG had been effectively shorn of its power to defend its members’ interests. The federation was reactivated briefly in 1972 but, as before, remained under the relatively close control of the state.